Journal of Gender, Social Policy & the Law
Volume 24 | Issue 1

Article 3

2015

Disparate Impact and Pregnancy: Title VII's Other
Accommodation Requirement
Camille Hébert

Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/jgspl
Part of the Civil Law Commons, Civil Rights and Discrimination Commons, Disability Law
Commons, Law and Gender Commons, and the Law and Society Commons
Recommended Citation
Camille Hébert (2015) "Disparate Impact and Pregnancy: Title VII's Other Accommodation Requirement," Journal of Gender, Social
Policy & the Law: Vol. 24: Iss. 1, Article 3.
Available at: http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/jgspl/vol24/iss1/3

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Washington College of Law Journals & Law Reviews at Digital Commons @ American
University Washington College of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Journal of Gender, Social Policy & the Law by an authorized administrator
of Digital Commons @ American University Washington College of Law. For more information, please contact fbrown@wcl.american.edu.

: Disparate Impact and Pregnancy
HEBERT 10/8/15 (DO NOT DELETE)

12/4/15 11:05 AM

DISPARATE IMPACT AND
PREGNANCY: TITLE VII’S OTHER
ACCOMMODATION REQUIREMENT
L. CAMILLE HÉBERT*
I. Introduction ........................................................................................... 108	
  
II. The Supreme Court’s Decisions on Pregnancy Discrimination........... 111	
  
III. The Supreme Court’s Decision in Young v. United Parcel Service,
Inc. .................................................................................................. 117	
  
IV. The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission’s Position on
Accommodation of Pregnancy ....................................................... 124	
  
V. What the Pregnancy Discrimination Act Says About the
Comparative Treatment of Women Affected by Pregnancy ......... 130	
  
VI. The Viability of Disparate Impact Claims Based on Pregnancy ........ 135	
  
VII. The Duty of Employers to Accommodate Pregnancy under the
Disparate Impact Theory	
  ...............................................................	
  142	
  
A.	
   The Prima Facie Case of Disparate Impact Based on
Pregnancy ................................................................................ 143	
  
1.	
   Nature of Required Showing of Disparate Impact ............ 143	
  
2.	
   Disparate Impact Challenges to Restrictive Leave
Policies ............................................................................... 149	
  
3.	
   Disparate Impact Challenges to Physical Job
Requirements ..................................................................... 155	
  
4.	
   Disparate Impact Challenges to Restrictive
Accommodation Policies ................................................... 158	
  
B.	
   The Job-Relatedness and Business Necessity of Employer
Failures to Extend Accommodations to Pregnant Women...... 163	
  
C.	
   Alternative Employment Practices to Failures to
Accommodate on the Basis of Pregnancy ............................... 169	
  
* Carter C. Kissell Professor of Law, Michael E. Moritz College of Law at the Ohio
State University. I appreciate the helpful comments provided on an earlier draft of this
article by Martha Chamallas, as well as the research support provided by the summer
research grant program of the Moritz College of Law. I also appreciate Christopher
McNeil’s willingness to read drafts of my writings, as well as his provision of moral
support and other accommodation for my scholarly work.

107

Published by Digital Commons @ American University Washington College of Law, 2016

1

Journal of Gender, Social Policy & the Law, Vol. 24, Iss. 1 [2016], Art. 3
HEBERT 10/8/15 (DO NOT DELETE)

108

12/4/15 11:05 AM

JOURNAL OF GENDER, SOCIAL POLICY & THE LAW

[Vol. 24:1

VIII. Conclusion ....................................................................................... 171	
  
I. INTRODUCTION
There has been a good deal of attention focused recently on questions
concerning how employers are allowed to treat pregnant women in the
workplace under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.1 The Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), the agency charged with
the enforcement of Title VII, has recently issued revised guidance
addressing issues of pregnancy, including the requirements imposed by
Title VII with respect to the accommodation of pregnant or recently
pregnant women experiencing disabling conditions.2 Additionally, the
United States Supreme Court recently decided a case, Young v. United
Parcel Service, Inc.,3 which addresses the circumstances under which an
employer will be found to have violated Title VII’s prohibition against
intentional discrimination for refusing to provide the same accommodation
to women affected by pregnancy as that employer provides to a number of
other categories of employees, including those injured on the job,
employees who have disabilities under the Americans With Disabilities
Act, or employees who have otherwise lost their ability to perform at least
some of the functions of their employment.
The disparate treatment theory, on which both the Young case and the
EEOC guidance are focused, is undoubtedly an important resource for
women affected by pregnancy and childbirth to seek accommodations
similar to those provided to other employees. However, neither the Young
case nor the new EEOC guidance focuses on the provision of Title VII
most likely to provide a mandate for employers to provide accommodation
to women affected by pregnancy who experience temporary inability to
perform part or all of their job functions. That provision, not raised at all in
the decision before the Supreme Court4 and slighted by the EEOC
1. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17
(2015).
2. U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, NO. 915.003, ENFORCEMENT
GUIDANCE: PREGNANCY DISCRIMINATION AND RELATED ISSUES (July 14, 2014). These
guidelines were superseded by modified guidelines issued after the Young v. United
Parcel Serv., Inc. case was decided by the Supreme Court. See U.S. EQUAL EMP.
OPPORTUNITY COMM’N NO. 915.003, ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE ON PREGNANCY
DISCRIMINATION AND RELATED ISSUES (June 25, 2015).
3. 575 U.S. __, 135 S. Ct. 1338 (2015).
4. The plaintiff in the Young v. United Parcel Service, Inc. case was allowed to
assert only a disparate treatment, not a disparate impact, claim; her motion to amend
her complaint to make out a claim of disparate impact was rejected by the district court.
See Young v. United Parcel Serv. Inc., 707 F.3d 437, 442 (4th Cir. 2013). The
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guidance, is the prohibition on employers maintaining even pregnancyneutral policies and practices that disproportionately disadvantage women
affected by pregnancy and cannot be justified by business necessity. It is
the disparate impact theory, rather than the disparate treatment theory,5 in
which Title VII’s requirement to accommodate pregnancy is most likely to
be found.
In a number of recent cases, both under Title VII and other statutes, the
Supreme Court has reaffirmed the importance of the disparate impact
theory to the anti-discrimination framework. Similarly, Congress, in the
Civil Rights Act of 1991, made clear its commitment to the disparate
impact theory as an important component of Title VII’s prohibition against
discrimination, including discrimination on the basis of sex. Although the
disparate treatment theory is an important tool for challenging employer
decisions that impose disadvantages on women affected by pregnancy and
childbirth, the disparate impact theory may provide assistance to women
challenging employer practices that impose similar disadvantages but may
not be unlawful as a matter of disparate treatment.
This article analyzes the Supreme Court’s decisions on pregnancy
Supreme Court’s decision also makes clear that the case before it involved only a claim
of disparate treatment; the Court noted that Young has not alleged a disparate impact
claim. Young, 135 S. Ct. at 1345 (“This case requires us to consider the application of
the second clause [of the Pregnancy Discrimination Act] to a ‘disparate-treatment’
claim—a claim that an employer intentionally treated a complainant less favorably than
employees with the ‘complainant’s qualifications’ but outside the complainant’s
protected class.”).
5. An early articulation by the Supreme Court of the differences between the
disparate treatment theory and the disparate impact theory remains one of its clearer
explanations. In Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 n.15
(1977), the Court explained the two theories in the following terms:
“Disparate treatment” such as is alleged in the present case is the most easily
understood type of discrimination. The employer simply treats some people
less favorably than others because of their race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin. Proof of discriminatory motive is critical, although it can in some
situations be inferred from the mere fact of differences in treatment.
Undoubtedly disparate treatment was the most obvious evil Congress had in
mind when it enacted Title VII.
Claims of disparate treatment may be distinguished from claims that stress
“disparate impact.” The latter involve employment practices that are facially
neutral in their treatment of different groups but that in fact fall more harshly
on one group than another and cannot be justified by business necessity. Proof
of discriminatory motive, we have held, is not required under a disparate
impact theory. Either theory may, of course, be applied to a particular set of
facts.
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discrimination, including the Court’s most recent decision in Young v.
United Parcel Service, Inc., as well as the EEOC’s recent and prior
statements on pregnancy discrimination and accommodations for pregnant
women.6 In doing so, the article first explains the limitations that the
disparate treatment theory poses for women seeking accommodations for
pregnancy. Next, the article measures the Court’s decisions and the EEOC
guidance against the language and legislative history of the Pregnancy
Discrimination Act and explains how that language and legislative history
is consistent with the use of the disparate impact theory to challenge
employers’ failures to accommodate pregnancy.7 The article then turns to
an analysis of whether and how pregnancy discrimination claims are
cognizable under the disparate impact theory as articulated by Congress
and the courts.8 The article then concludes with an examination of how the
disparate impact theory can mandate that employers provide
accommodations to women affected by pregnancy, whether or not they
provide those accommodations to other employees who are temporarily
unable to perform their job duties.9
The article identifies three types of employer policies and practices with
respect to accommodation of disabilities associated with pregnancy and
childbirth that might be challenged under the disparate impact theory:
employer limitations on leave or absences; heavy lifting or other physical
requirements imposed by certain jobs; and employer accommodation
policies that restrict accommodation to employees injured on the job or to
some other class of workers.10 The article first discusses how such
employer practices and policies might be challenged as a prima facie
violation of the disparate impact theory, demonstrating that such policies

6.
7.
8.
9.

See infra Parts II, III, IV.
See infra Part V.
See infra Parts VI, VII.
Other commentators have argued that litigants should look to the disparate
impact theory as a way to challenge actions by employers that disadvantage women
affected by pregnancy and childbirth. See Joanna L. Grossman & Gillian L. Thomas,
Making Pregnancy Work: Overcoming the Pregnancy Discrimination Act’s CapacityBased Model, 21 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 15, 41-49 (2009); Christine Jolles,
Antidiscrimination and Accommodation, 115 HARV. L. REV. 642, 660-65 (2001); Reva
Siegel, Note, Employment Equality under the Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978,
94 YALE L.J. 929, 940-49 (1985). Those commentators, however, have not generally
undertaken to critique in detail the existing cases addressing disparate impact claims
based on pregnancy or to demonstrate how a correct application of the standards of
disparate impact announced by the Supreme Court, as well as the Court’s cases on
pregnancy discrimination, should result in success for a plaintiff in a properly litigated
claim.
10. See infra Part VII.
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and practices are likely to disproportionately disadvantage women affected
by pregnancy because of the temporary physical limitations associated with
pregnancy and childbirth.11 The article critiques existing cases that have
rejected such challenges and explains both the errors of analysis in those
cases and the ways in which plaintiffs might avoid the rejection of such
challenges.
Next, the article discusses the defenses employers are likely to assert to
combat prima facie claims of disparate impact challenging these types of
practices, explaining what employers should be required to prove to justify
their challenged practices as job related and supported by business
necessity.12 The article also demonstrates why courts should generally
reject those defenses in the context of the three types of claims likely to be
made under the disparate impact theory. Even if employers are able to
justify their practices under the job-related and business-necessity defenses,
the article demonstrates that women affected by pregnancy may prevail
under the third step of disparate impact analysis, by establishing the
existence of less discriminatory alternatives to those practices, including an
alternative that provides the same accommodations to women affected by
pregnancy that the employer already provides to other employees.13
The article concludes with a call to the EEOC to not only clarify and
supplement its recent guidance on pregnancy discrimination with respect to
issues of disparate impact, but, consistent with its stated strategic goals, to
become more heavily involved in the litigation of disparate impact
challenges to employer practices that disproportionately affect pregnant
women and the failure of employers to provide accommodations to those
women.14
II. THE SUPREME COURT’S DECISIONS ON PREGNANCY DISCRIMINATION
The track record of the United States Supreme Court in its consideration
of issues of pregnancy discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964 has been mixed. Its first encounter with these issues was
inauspicious. In the first case in which the legality under Title VII of
disadvantaging women on the basis of their pregnancy was squarely
presented,15 General Electric Co. v. Gilbert,16 the majority of the Court
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.

See infra Part VII.A.
See infra Part VII.B.
See infra Part VII.C.
See infra Part VIII.
In an earlier case, Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632, 651
(1974), the Court held that rules by school boards mandating that pregnant women take
leave four or five months before the expected birth constituted a denial of due process
because those arbitrary dates had no valid relationship to a legitimate state interest.
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held that discrimination on the basis of pregnancy was in fact not sex
discrimination. The Court held that an exclusion based on pregnancy was
not a distinction based on gender, noting that such a distinction merely
divided pregnant persons, whom the Court conceded were all women, from
non-pregnant persons, who could be either men or women.17 In addition,
the majority justified treating pregnant women differently from other
persons disabled in the workplace because pregnancy was different:
“Pregnancy is, of course, confined to women, but it is in other ways
significantly different from the typical covered disease or disability. The
District Court found that it is not a ‘disease at all, and is often a voluntarily
undertaken and desired condition.’”18
The majority’s reasoning and holding in Gilbert was soundly rejected,
not just by the dissenters,19 but also by Congress. In direct response to
Gilbert, Congress enacted the Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978,
which added § 701(k) to Title VII, which provides in part that:
The Court noted that since the events in the case, Title VII had been amended to apply
to state agencies and that the EEOC had taken the position that mandatory leave for
pregnant women presumptively violated Title VII and that the “practical impact of our
decision in the present cases may have been somewhat lessened by [those] recent
developments.” LaFleur, 414 U.S. at 638 n.8.
16. 429 U.S. 125, 147 (1976).
17. In reaching this conclusion, the Gilbert majority relied on the earlier case of
Geduldig v. Aiello, in which the Court had held that discrimination on the basis of
pregnancy was not sex discrimination in connection with an equal protection challenge
to a state disability leave program that excluded coverage for pregnancy-related
disabilities. Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484, 496-97, n.20 (1974) (“The lack of
identity between the excluded disability and gender as such under this insurance
program becomes clear upon the most cursory analysis. The program divides potential
recipients into two groups—pregnant women and non-pregnant persons. While the
first group is exclusively female, the second group includes members of both sexes.”).
The Court’s analysis in Aiello was indeed cursory. As Justice Brennan indicated in his
dissent in that case, the program’s “dissimilar treatment of men and women, on the
basis of physical characteristics inextricably linked to one sex, inevitably constitutes
sex discrimination.” Id. at 501 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
18. Gilbert, 429 U.S. at 134-36.
19. The dissent by Justices Brennan and Marshall disagreed with the conclusion of
the majority that General Electric’s decision to cover all other disabilities, even those
that were sex-linked, but to exclude disabilities arising from pregnancy, was sexneutral, essentially faulting the majority for allowing pregnancy to be singled out for
disadvantageous treatment as inconsistent with the purpose of Title VII. Id. at 160
(Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens was even more direct in his dissent. He
noted that the challenged rule was not neutral but “places the risk of absence caused by
pregnancy in a class by itself.” He stated persuasively that: “By definition, such a rule
discriminates on account of sex; for it is the capacity to become pregnant which
primarily differentiates the female from the male.” Id. at 161-62 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
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The terms ‘because of sex’ or ‘on the basis of sex’ include, but are not
limited to, because of or on the basis of pregnancy, childbirth, or related
medical conditions; and women affected by pregnancy, childbirth, or
related medical conditions shall be treated the same for all employmentrelated purposes, including receipt of benefits under fringe benefit
programs, as other persons not so affected but similar in their ability or
20
inability to work.

The legislative history of the Pregnancy Discrimination Act makes clear
that Congress intended to disapprove not only of the holding in Gilbert,
that pregnancy could be excluded from coverage under fringe benefit
programs, but also its reasoning that discrimination on the basis of
pregnancy was not a form of sex discrimination.21
In Newport News Shipbuilding and Dry Dock Co. v. EEOC,22 the
Supreme Court’s first post-Gilbert and post-Pregnancy Discrimination Act
case addressing issues of pregnancy discrimination,23 the majority of the
Court recognized that Congress had in fact overruled the Gilbert decision.24
20. Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-555, 92 Stat. 2076
(1976).
21. See Foreword by Chairman Harrison A. Williams, Jr., Legislative History of
the Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978, Prepared for the Committee on Labor and
Human Resources, United States Senate (U.S. Government Printing Office June 1980).
The United States Supreme Court in Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v.
EEOC itself recognized that Congress in the Pregnancy Discrimination Act
“unambiguously expressed its disapproval of both the holding and the reasoning” of the
Court’s decision in Gilbert. 462 U.S. 669, 677 (1983). See also infra text
accompanying notes 93-107 (discussing the legislative history of the Pregnancy
Discrimination Act of 1978).
22. 462 U.S. 669 (1983).
23. The Supreme Court did decide another case of pregnancy discrimination after
Gilbert and before the enactment of the Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978. That
case, Nashville Gas Co. v. Satty, 434 U.S. 136 (1977), is discussed at text
accompanying notes 108 to 110.
24. Id. at 670 (“In 1978 Congress decided to overrule our decision in General
Electric Co. v. Gilbert by amending Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ‘to
prohibit sex discrimination on the basis of pregnancy.’”). The dissent, on the other
hand, claimed that “it is the Court, and not Congress, which is now overruling Gilbert.”
Id. at 686 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
Years later, when the majority of the Court in AT&T Corp. v. Hulteen, 556 U.S.
701 (2009), held that the Pregnancy Discrimination Act did not prevent the employer
from penalizing women with respect to their current pension benefits because of the
treatment of pregnancy leaves that they had taken before the effective date of that Act,
in that that treatment was not unlawful at the time of those leaves because of the
Court’s decision in Gilbert that discrimination on the basis of pregnancy was not sex
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That case involved the question of whether the employer unlawfully
discriminated against its male employees by providing less generous
coverage for their spousal dependents for pregnancy than for other medical
conditions.25 The Court held that the employer violated Title VII because
“it is discriminatory to treat pregnancy-related conditions less favorably
than other medical conditions.”26 The Court went on to conclude that
because the male employees were provided worse coverage for their
spouses than were female employees, whose spouses did not suffer the
same limitation, the male employees suffered discrimination because of
sex.27 The Court concluded that “[b]y making clear that an employer could
not discriminate on the basis of an employee’s pregnancy, Congress did not
erase the original prohibition against discrimination on the basis of an
employee’s sex.”28
The Supreme Court took an expansive view of the Pregnancy
Discrimination Act in its next decision interpreting that provision and its
effect on Title VII’s prohibition against sex discrimination. In California
Federal Savings and Loan Ass’n v. Guerra,29 the Court had to decide
whether Title VII preempted a state statute that mandated certain benefits
for pregnant woman. In holding that the state statute was not preempted,
the Court noted that Congress intended the Pregnancy Discrimination Act
to be “‘a floor beneath which pregnancy disability benefits may not drop—
not a ceiling above which they may not rise.’”30 The Court noted that
Congress had expressed concern about the ways in which pregnant women
were disadvantaged in the workplace and made to choose between family
and career, and indicated that the Pregnancy Discrimination Act was
intended to “provide relief to working women and to end discrimination
against pregnant workers.”31 The Court noted that the Pregnancy
discrimination, Justice Ginsburg called the Gilbert decision “astonishing” and
“aberrational” and called for the Court to “explicitly overrule Gilbert so that decision
can generate no more mischief.” Id. at 722, 726, 728 (Ginburg, J., dissenting). Three
years later, Justice Ginsburg in her dissent in Coleman v. Court of Appeals of
Maryland, indicated that she would hold that the Court’s decision in Geduldig v. Aiello,
on which the Gilbert Court had relied, “was egregiously wrong to declare that
discrimination on the basis of pregnancy is not discrimination on the basis of sex.” 132
S. Ct. 1327, 1345 (2012) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
25. Newport News, 462 U.S. at 684.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 674-75.
28. Id. at 684-85.
29. 479 U.S. 272, 273 (1987).
30. Id. at 285 (quoting Cal. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Guerra, 758 F.2d 390, 396
(9th Cir. 1985)).
31. Id. at 285-86, n.19.
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Discrimination Act extends to pregnancy Title VII’s objective to “achieve
equality of employment opportunity and remove barriers that have operated
in the past,” citing to a statement by the sponsor of the Act that “‘[t]he
entire thrust behind this legislation is to guarantee women the basic right to
participate fully and equally in the workforce, without denying them the
fundamental right to full participation in family life.’”32
The Supreme Court also touched on the meaning of the Pregnancy
Discrimination Act in its decision in International Union, United
Automobile, Aerospace and Agricultural Implement Workers of America v.
Johnson Controls, Inc.,33 a decision striking down employer policies that
explicitly restricted the ability of fertile women, but not fertile men, to
work in jobs involving fetal hazards. Making clear that it was the disparate
treatment, and not the disparate impact, theory that applied to such facially
discriminatory policies, the Court described the Pregnancy Discrimination
Act as containing a “BFOQ [bona fide occupational qualification] standard
of its own: Unless pregnant employees differ from others ‘in their ability
or inability to work,’ they must be ‘treated the same’ as other employees
‘for all employment-related purposes.’”34 The Court went on to indicate
that “women as capable of doing their jobs as their male counterparts may
not be forced to choose between having a child and having a job.”35
Some courts have asserted that the Johnson Controls case makes clear
that the Pregnancy Discrimination Act cannot be interpreted to require an
employer to make accommodations for pregnancy, seizing upon the
Court’s quotation from a concurring opinion in Arizona Governing
Committee for Tax Deferred Annuity and Deferred Compensation Plans v.
Norris36 to the effect that Congress made the decision to “forbid special
treatment of pregnancy despite the social costs associated therewith.”37
32. Id. at 288-89 (quoting statement of Senator Williams, 123 CONG. REC. 2968
(1977)).
33. 499 U.S. 187, 211 (1991).
34. Id. at 204.
35. Id.
36. 463 U.S. 1073, 1084 n.14 (1983) (Marshall, J., concurring in the judgment).
The Norris case did not deal with pregnancy discrimination at all, but rather addressed
the question of whether employers could offer lesser pension benefits to women
because of the greater costs of providing pension benefits to women, who generally live
longer than men. The Court held in a per curiam opinion that such action violated Title
VII. Id. at 1074.
37. See Sussman v. Salem, Saxon & Nielsen, P.A., 153 F.R.D. 689, 692 (M.D. Fla.
1994) (“This Court recognizes the Supreme Court’s opinion that the Pregnancy
Discrimination Act was not intended to provide accommodations to pregnant
employees when such accommodations rise to the level of preferential treatment.
Congress considered at length the considerable cost of providing equal treatment of
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However, the Johnson Controls case means no such thing. When the
Johnson Controls Court quoted the “special treatment” language from
Norris, it was clearly referring to “special treatment” that treated pregnancy
worse than, not better than, other conditions38; the reference to “special
treatment” in Norris meant the same thing.39 Accordingly, the Johnson
Controls Court held that the Pregnancy Discrimination Act forbids treating
pregnancy worse than other conditions; after all, the Court was addressing
the question of whether employers could intentionally discriminate against
pregnant or fertile women by refusing to employ them because of a
perceived risk of fetal harm, not whether employers had to take action to
reduce exposure of women to fetal harm. Nothing in that case holds or
even suggests that employers do not have to provide accommodations
sought by pregnant women to deal with the physical aspects of
pregnancy.40 Curiously, the courts that have wrenched this language out of
pregnancy and related conditions, but made the “decision to forbid special treatment of
pregnancy despite the social costs associated therewith.”) (citations omitted).
38. This is what the Court in Johnson Controls said:
The extra cost of employing members of one sex, however, does not provide
an affirmative Title VII defense for a discriminatory refusal to hire members of
that gender. Indeed, in passing the PDA, Congress considered at length the
considerable cost of proving equal treatment of pregnancy and related
conditions, but made the ‘decision to forbid special treatment of pregnancy
despite the social costs associated therewith.’
Johnson Controls, 499 U.S. at 210 (citations omitted). Read in context, it is clear that
the Court is using the term “special treatment” to refer to disadvantaging women
because of pregnancy, not the issue of accommodation of pregnancy.
39. This is what Justice Marshall said in the footnote to his concurring opinion in
Norris:
In enacting the PDA, Congress recognized that requiring employers to cover
pregnancy on the same terms as other disabilities would add approximately
$200 million to their total costs, but concluded that the PDA was necessary “to
clarify [the] original intent” of Title VII. Since the purpose of the PDA was
simply to make the treatment of pregnancy consistent with general Title VII
principles, Congress’ decision to forbid special treatment of pregnancy despite
the special costs associated therewith provides further
support
for
our
conclusion in Manhart that the greater costs of providing retirement benefits
for female employees does not justify the use of a sex-based retirement plan.
Norris, 463 U.S. at 1084 n.14 (Marshall, J., concurring in the judgment) (citations
omitted). Read in context, it is clear that the reference to “special treatment of
pregnancy” was a reference to the fact that women could not be disadvantaged because
of pregnancy and did not address in any way the issue of accommodation of pregnancy.
40. In any event, the Johnson Controls Court made clear that the claim involved in
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context to declare that the Pregnancy Discrimination Act forbids
“preferential” treatment of pregnancy have ignored the language from the
Guerra case, which was in fact dealing with issues of pregnancy
accommodations under state law, declaring that Congress intended the
Pregnancy Discrimination Act to be “‘a floor beneath which pregnancy
disability benefits may not drop—not a ceiling above which they may not
rise.’”41 That is, the only time that the Court has considered the issue of the
“preferential” treatment of pregnancy, it has made clear that such treatment
is not inconsistent with the dictates of Title VII in general or the Pregnancy
Discrimination Act in particular, yet the lower courts have chosen to ignore
that aspect of the Court’s decisions on pregnancy.
Accordingly, in none of these cases did the Court directly address the
question of whether employers are required by the Pregnancy
Discrimination Act to provide workplace accommodations to women
affected by pregnancy. But the Court’s general approach in its latter cases
suggests its recognition that Congress wanted to reduce the burdens faced
by working women associated with pregnancy, so that they were not forced
to “choose between having a child and having a job” when they were
similarly capable (or similarly limited) in performing their job functions as
other employees who were not compelled to make that choice. The Court’s
language also suggests that pregnancy is in fact required to be treated no
worse than employers treat other medical conditions and that the focus of
employers in making employment-related decisions concerning women
affected by pregnancy should be their ability or inability to work, not other
factors, such as the source of any such inability. Finally, the Court’s
reference to the statutory phrase “all employment-related purposes” clearly
would encompass issues of workplace accommodation for employees who
face a temporary inability to perform the functions of their jobs.
III. THE SUPREME COURT’S DECISION IN YOUNG V. UNITED PARCEL
SERVICE, INC.
The case of Young v. United Parcel Service, Inc. required the Court, for

that case was a claim of disparate treatment, not disparate impact, and that it was
applying the bona fide occupational defense, which it said was the only defense
available to justify the employer’s practice. The lower courts had applied the disparate
impact theory and its business necessity defense to uphold the employer’s policy,
which the Court said was inappropriate. 499 U.S. at 193-202. Accordingly, no matter
what Johnson Controls might mean with respect to claims under the disparate
treatment theory and its bona fide occupational qualification defense, it does not say
anything about whether accommodation of pregnancy might be required under a claim
of disparate impact.
41. Cal. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272, 280 (1987).
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the first time, to address the duty of employers under Title VII to extend
accommodations to pregnant women when they extend accommodations to
other similarly situated employees. Peggy Young worked for UPS as a
part-time, early morning “air driver,” who generally carried lighter
packages because the greater expense of air delivery means that lighter
packages are generally sent by air, while heavier packages are sent by
ground delivery.42 She became pregnant in a third round of in vitro
fertilization, having suffered a previous miscarriage, and sought
accommodation consistent with the twenty pound lifting restriction
recommended by her health care provider.43 That accommodation was
refused, based on the employer’s asserted policy of providing
accommodations only to employees who had suffered on-the-job injuries,
who qualified as disabled under the American With Disabilities Act, or
who had lost their DOT certification.44
The district court held that Young had not even made out a prima facie
case of pregnancy discrimination under Title VII.45 The court concluded
that Young had not shown that she was treated differently than similarly
situated employees under UPS’s “pregnancy neutral” policy, because her
inability to perform all aspects of her job was physical, while the inability
of employees who had lost their DOT certification was legal in nature.46
Accordingly, the district court granted summary judgment against Young
on her claim of pregnancy discrimination under Title VII.47
The court of appeals upheld the district court’s grant of summary
judgment on essentially the same grounds,48 although the court of appeals
recognized that the language of the Pregnancy Discrimination Act could be
read to support Young’s claim that she was entitled to the same
accommodation provided by the employer to other employees. The court
of appeals noted that the second clause of the Pregnancy Discrimination
Act—that which mandates that women affected by pregnancy “shall be
treated the same for all employment-related purposes . . . as other persons
not so affected but similar in their ability or inability to work”—was
42. Young v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., No. DKC 08-2586, 2011 WL 665321, at *1
(D. Md. Feb. 14, 2011).
43. Id. at *7.
44. Id. at *2-6, 11.
45. Id. at *12-14.
46. Id. In rejecting Young’s claim that the Pregnancy Discrimination Act does not
confer “least-favored nation” status on pregnant women, the district court noted that
“[t]he law is different, however. ‘Employers can treat pregnant women as badly as they
treat similarly affected but non-pregnant employees.’” Id. at *14.
47. Id. at *22.
48. Young v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 707 F.3d 437, 445-51 (4th Cir. 2013).
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“unambiguous” and could be read to support the contention that pregnant
women were required to receive different—”perhaps even preferential”—
treatment.49 But the court of appeals said that that reading was contradicted
by the first clause of the Act, which specifies that discrimination on the
basis of pregnancy is a form of sex discrimination.50 The court of appeals
read the first clause of the Act as an indication that pregnancy was to be
treated just like any other form of sex discrimination.51 The court of
appeals noted the anomaly of a contrary position—that “pregnancy would
be treated more favorably than any other basis, including non-pregnancyrelated sex discrimination, covered by Title VII.”52 The court of appeals
noted, by way of example, that the position advocated by the plaintiff
would mean that a pregnant woman would be entitled to accommodation,
49.
50.
51.
52.

Id. at 447.
Id.
Id.
Id. What the court of appeals apparently failed to understand is that the
language on which it relied to limit the “unambiguous” mandate of the second clause of
the Act—the definition of “sex” to include “pregnancy”—nowhere says that pregnancy
is to be treated exactly like all other forms of sex discrimination or that that language
must be read not to alter Title VII analysis in any other way. In fact, the addition of the
language mandating that women affected by pregnancy must be treated in the same
manner as other employees similarly situated with respect to their ability to work does
result in differences between pregnancy and other forms of discrimination, simply
because of differences in the statutory language. And the fact that this language is
found in a definition section of the statute cannot be used to show that its effect is
limited. After all, the statutory mandate to provide accommodation for religious
practice and belief is also found in the section of Title VII that defines “religion.” See
42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j). The majority of the Court in EEOC v. Abercrombie & Fitch
Stores, Inc. confirmed that that provision imposes an affirmative duty on employers to
accommodate the religious practices and beliefs of employees and job applicants. 575
U.S. __, 135 S. Ct. 2028, 2034 (2015).
Nor does the Abercrombie Court’s holding that the plaintiff’s claim in that
case, that she was not hired because of the need to accommodate her religious belief by
making an exception to its neutral “Look Policy” to allow her to wear a head scarf, was
a disparate treatment claim rather than a disparate impact claim suggest that claims of
accommodation are not cognizable under the disparate impact theory. Abercrombie,
135 S. Ct. at 2031-34. The Court in that case indicated that failure to accommodate
claims under the religious discrimination provisions are disparate treatment claims
precisely because there is an express accommodation requirement for religion, causing
employer actions motivated by the desire to avoid that accommodation to be
categorized as intentional discrimination. With respect to pregnancy, on the other
hand, for which there is no express statutory requirement of accommodation, failures to
accommodate by failing to waive neutral rules are cognizable under the disparate
impact theory, the theory generally available for challenging the discriminatory effect
of neutral employer practices, regardless of the motivation of the employer for that
failure.
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while “a temporary lifting restriction placed on an employee who injured
his back while picking up his infant child or on an employee whose lifting
limitation arose from her off-the-job work as a volunteer firefighter would
be ineligible for any accommodation.”53
The Supreme Court majority in Young, on the other hand, seemed to
recognize that the statutory language regarding pregnancy did justify a
different type of analysis of pregnancy discrimination claims than other
types of claims, including other types of sex discrimination claims, under
Title VII.54 The Court noted that its approach was “limited to the
Pregnancy Discrimination Act context”55 but was still generally consistent
with its approach of allowing employees to establish intent to discriminate
on the part of the employer and to rebut the employer’s assertion of nondiscriminatory reasons for its actions by circumstantial evidence.56
The approach announced by the Court majority for employees seeking to
prove by indirect or circumstantial evidence that an employer’s failure to
accommodate pregnant women while accommodating other employees was
intentionally discriminatory is a version of the McDonnell Douglas test
previously adopted by the Court as the standard for plaintiffs to use to
prove intent to discriminate inferentially.57 The Young Court indicated that
in order for an employee to make out a prima facie case of intentional
discrimination on the basis of pregnancy based on the denial of an
accommodation, she must establish: “that she belongs to the protected
class, that she sought accommodation, that the employer did not
accommodate her, and that the employer did accommodate others ‘similar
in their ability or inability to work.’”58 The Court held that Young had
established a prima facie case under this standard, concluding that she had
established a genuine dispute that UPS had treated more favorably “at least
some employees whose situation cannot reasonably be distinguished from
Young’s.”59 Accordingly, it appears that the Court rejected the conclusion
of the lower courts that employees injured on the job, employees who
qualify as disabled under the ADA, and employees who lost their DOT
certification were all not similarly situated to pregnant women as a matter
of law.60
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.

Young, 707 F.3d at 448.
Young v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 575 U.S. __, 135 S. Ct. 1338, 1355 (2015).
Id.
Id.
The test was developed in the case of McDonnell Douglas v. Green, 411 U.S.
792, 801 (1973).
58. Young, 135 S. Ct. at 1354.
59. Id. at 1355.
60. The Court made clear that the prima facie case does not require a plaintiff to
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The Court indicated that once an employee has made a prima facie case
of failure to accommodate, the employer can then seek to justify its refusal
to accommodate with a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for denying
the accommodation.61 Although the Court did not indicate what might
constitute such a reason, it made clear what type of showing would not
meet that burden: “But, consistent with the Act’s basic objective, that
reason normally cannot consist simply of a claim that it is more expensive
or less convenient to add pregnant women to the category of those (‘similar
in their ability or inability to work’) whom the employer accommodates.”62
The Court seems to have reasoned that such an insubstantial justification
for different treatment of pregnant women would not have the effect of
rebutting the inference of intentional discrimination raised by the plaintiff’s
prima facie case.
The Young Court next addressed the “pretext” stage of the McDonnell
Douglas proof scheme. The majority of the Court indicated that a plaintiff
can establish that the employer’s asserted reasons are pretextual and “may
reach a jury on this issue” by making the following showing: “that the
employer’s policies impose a significant burden on pregnant workers, and
that the employer’s ‘legitimate, nondiscriminatory’ reasons are not
sufficiently strong to justify the burden, but rather—when considered along
with the burden imposed—give rise to an inference of intentional
discrimination.”63 The Court noted that a plaintiff can establish the
existence of such a significant burden by demonstrating, as alleged by
Young, that the employer accommodates a large percentage of nonestablish “that those whom the employer favored and those whom the employer
disfavored were similar in all but the protected ways.” Id. at 1354. The Court may
have been suggesting that Young was similarly situated to each of those groups of
employees by its question: “when the employer accommodated so many, could it not
accommodate pregnant women as well?” Id. at 1355. In any event, the Court’s failure
to make clear which of the three categories of other employees that UPS
accommodated were similarly situated to Young is unfortunate, because the Court’s
failure to do so is likely to generate confusion in the lower courts, particularly in view
of the prior holdings of a number of courts that employees injured on-the-job and
employees who qualify as disabled under the ADA are not similarly situated to
pregnant women for purposes of the prima facie case. Justice Alito, in his opinion
concurring in the judgment, seems to have taken the position that while employees
injured on the job and employees who were disabled under the ADA were not similarly
situated to pregnant women, employees who lost their DOT certification might be, such
that UPS may not have had a “neutral,” that is, non-discriminatory, business reason for
treating them more favorably than it treated pregnant women. See id. at 1360-61
(Alito, J., concurring in the judgment).
61. Id. at 1354.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 1354-55.
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pregnant workers while failing to accommodate a large percentage of
pregnant workers.64 The Court noted that the existence of multiple policies
of accommodating non-pregnant workers, as UPS had, might suggest that
the reasons given for failing to accommodate pregnant workers were not
sufficiently strong, allowing a jury to conclude that the employer had
engaged in intentional discrimination against those pregnant women.65 The
reasoning of the Court majority seems to be that if the employer generally
accommodates employees who are not pregnant, while refusing to extend
accommodations to pregnant women without a strong reason, then the
inference can be drawn that the employer’s policies are motivated by an
intent to discriminate on the basis of pregnancy. Or, as the Court put it:
“why, when the employer accommodated so many, could it not
accommodate pregnant women as well?”66
Justice Scalia, in a dissent joined by Justices Thomas and Kennedy,
harshly criticized the majority for not adopting his interpretation of the
statute—he noted that the majority “refuses to adopt the reading I
propose.”67 He proclaimed the majority’s interpretation of the statutory
language to be “as dubious in principle as it is senseless in practice” and
indicated that the majority reached this interpretation by “a couple of waves
of the Supreme Wand to produce the desired result”—he used to term
“Poof!” three times in his opinion.68 Justice Scalia’s most reasoned
challenge to the Court’s decision occurred when he indicated that the Court
had confused the disparate treatment and the disparate impact theories.69
He suggested that the Court’s opinion used the notions of the effects of an
employer’s practice and the lack of justification, borrowed from disparate
impact analysis, and imported them into disparate treatment challenges to
pregnancy discrimination. He asserted that “[t]oday’s decision can thus
serve only one purpose: allowing claims that belong under Title VII’s
disparate-impact provisions to be brought under its disparate-treatment
provisions instead.”70
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 1355.
Id. at 1363 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Id. at 1361, 1364-65 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Justice Scalia’s challenge on this point may be more reasoned, but, as
indicated below, it is still wrong. And it is no less disrespectful than the rest of his
opinion. He introduced this part of his opinion with the phrase, “The fun does not stop
there,” and indicated that the Court’s opinion “proceeds to bungle the dichotomy
between claims of disparate treatment and claims of disparate impact”; he pronounced
the majority’s rule as “[d]eliciously incoherent.” Id. at 1365 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
70. Id. at 1365-66 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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But Justice Scalia has mistaken both the intent and the effect of the
Court’s decision. Although it is true that the factors relied on by the
majority to establish a claim under the standard that it articulated—the
relative effect of the employer’s policies on pregnant women and other
persons and its justifications for the policies—might well be used to
establish a claim of disparate impact challenging the failure to
accommodate pregnant women,71 the majority made clear that these factors
are relevant under the standard it articulated only to the issue of whether
the plaintiff had made out a case of intentional discrimination.72
Accordingly, under the standard articulated by the majority, if the plaintiff
were to make the showing required by the Court’s standard, but the
decision maker were still not convinced that the employer’s motive was
discriminatory, the plaintiff would presumably lose on her claim of
discrimination. Nor is it unusual for the same facts and evidence to raise
claims of both disparate treatment and disparate impact. The Court
recognized in the very case in which it first clearly articulated the
difference between the disparate treatment and disparate impact theories
that “[e]ither theory may, of course, be applied to a particular set of
facts.”73
The Young Court’s clarification that the disparate treatment challenge
asserted by the plaintiff in that case will ultimately require the decision
maker to determine that the employer acted with discriminatory intent in its
different treatment of the plaintiff as compared to similarly situated
employees reveals the limitations of the disparate treatment theory for
women seeking accommodation of pregnancy and childbirth. If the
employer engages in such different treatment, but the decision maker is not
convinced that the employer had discriminatory motive, then the plaintiff’s
disparate treatment claim will fail. Similarly, the very nature of a disparate
treatment claim requires different treatment, such that an employer’s action
of failing to accommodate pregnancy can be challenged under that theory
only if the employer does accommodate other employees. The disparate
impact theory, on the other hand, can be asserted to challenge an
employer’s failure to accommodate pregnancy and childbirth even in the
absence of discriminatory intent or different treatment of other employees.
71. See infra text accompanying notes 138 – 251 (explaining how a disparate
impact claim challenging failure to accommodate pregnant women might be
established).
72. Young, 135 S. Ct. at 1355 (“Moreover, the continued focus on whether the
plaintiff has introduced sufficient evidence to give rise to an inference of intentional
discrimination avoids confusing the disparate-treatment and disparate-impact
doctrines.”) (emphasis in original).
73. Int’l Bd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 n.15 (1977).
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IV. THE EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION’S POSITION ON
ACCOMMODATION OF PREGNANCY
In reaching its decision in Young v. United Parcel Service, Inc., the
Court majority refused to give significant weight to the more recent
pronouncement of the EEOC on the scope of the requirement that
employers provide accommodations to pregnant women when they provide
accommodations to other employees. The majority indicated that it would
not “rely significantly” on the EEOC’s guidance because that guidance was
issued recently, after the Court’s grant of certiorari, and because the
position taken in the guidance was addressing an issue on which its prior
guidelines were silent and was contrary to a position taken earlier by the
United States government—not the EEOC. The majority also indicated
that the EEOC had not explained the basis for its most recent guidance.74
The EEOC’s Enforcement Guidance on Pregnancy and Related Issues
was initially issued on July 14, 2014, over the dissents of two members of
the Commission, who objected to the guidance for some of the same
reasons noted by the Young majority for its refusal to defer to that
guidance. Among other objections to that guidance, the dissenting
members suggested that the Commission had acted improperly, or at least
unwisely, in issuing guidance while some of the issues addressed in the
guidance were pending before the Supreme Court; one dissenting member
suggested that the Commission should not have acted “to get out in front of
the Court,”75 while the other expressed her hope that “this is the last time
this Commission elects to jump ahead of the U.S. Supreme Court.”76 This
is a peculiar criticism by members of the agency charged with the
enforcement of Title VII—to suggest that the agency should let the
Supreme Court have the first opportunity to interpret a statute; one might
have thought that the Court might be interested in the views of that expert
agency in reaching its conclusions on the meaning of the statute. It is also
peculiar to suggest that the Commission has somehow acted precipitously
in rushing its guidelines to press before the Court is able to act—the
administrative equivalent to trying to beat the train at the crossing gates—
when the guidance was the result of an ongoing process started more than
two years previously.77 One might have thought to fault the agency for
74. Young, 135 S. Ct. at 1351-52.
75. Victoria A. Lipnic, Statement of the Honorable Victoria A. Lipnic,

Commissioner, U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Enforcement
Guidance on Pregnancy Discrimination and Related Issues (July 14, 2014).
76. Constance S. Barker, Public Statement on Issuance of EEOC Enforcement
Guidance on Pregnancy Discrimination and Related Issues (July 14, 2014).
77. Chai R. Feldblum, Statement on Approval of the Enforcement Guidance on
Pregnancy Discrimination and Related Issues (July 14, 2014) (setting forth in
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moving too slowly, rather than for moving too fast.
The major substantive criticism by the dissenting members of the EEOC
appears to be that the guidance contains a novel interpretation of the
Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978. Commissioner Barker identified
what she called a “fatal flaw” of the guidance—that it “offered a novel
interpretation of the PDA for which there was no legal basis.”78 She went
on to identify that “novel interpretation” as the fact that the guidance
“states that the PDA requires employers to give reasonable
accommodations to employees who have work restrictions because of their
pregnancy. Thus, the Guidance gives even those who do not have a
disability as defined by the Act, as amended, the same right to reasonable
accommodation as individuals with disabilities.”79 Commissioner Lipnic
declared that the guidance “adopts new and dramatic substantive changes
to the law.” She identified one of those changes in the following way:
The Guidance takes the novel position that under the language of the
PDA, a pregnant worker is, as a practical matter, entitled to “reasonable
accommodation” as that term is defined by the Americans with
Disabilities Act (“ADA”). No federal Court of Appeals has adopted this
position; indeed, those which have addressed the question have rejected
it. Moreover, the Pregnancy Guidance states that non-pregnant workers
receiving such reasonable accommodations are the appropriate
comparators for purposes of PDA compliance. This, too, is a position
rejected by the majority of courts which have considered it. These
positions represent a dramatic departure from the Commission’s prior
position, and perhaps more important, contravene the statutory language
of the PDA. They do so without sound legal basis or rigorous analysis,
and no explanation for the reversal of long-standing Commission
80
policy.

While it is certainly true that the Commission’s position on the proper
interpretation of the Pregnancy Discrimination Act has not been adopted by
Appendix A to her statement the timeline for consideration of the issue addressed in the
guidance, beginning with the February 8, 2012 announcement of a public meeting on
the subject of pregnancy discrimination). Commissioner Feldblum also took issue with
the suggestion of the dissenting commissioners that the Commission should have
waited for the Court to act: “Under our basic constitutional structure, Congress is
responsible for passing a law; an agency that executes the law is responsible for issuing
guidance to advise those with rights and responsibilities under the law; and courts,
including the Supreme Court, have the final authority and responsibility to interpret the
works of a statute as applicable in a particular case.”
78. Barker, supra note 76.
79. Id.
80. Lipnic, supra note 75.
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the courts generally, it is not clear that the Commission’s current position is
inconsistent with its prior approach to this issue, such that it can accurately
be said that the Commission has reversed any “long-standing” policy.
First, the dissenting commissioners are not entirely accurate in
characterizing the guidance as interpreting the Pregnancy Discrimination
Act as imposing on employers an independent duty of “reasonable
accommodation,” as that term is defined under the Americans With
Disabilities Act, with respect to pregnant women. Instead, what the
guidance does say is that if the employer treats disabled employees in a
certain way, it must extend that same treatment to pregnant women whose
pregnancies impose obstacles to their ability to work similar to those
experienced by the disabled workers.81 The Commission’s interpretation is
demonstrated by its Example 10 in the guidance:
An employer has a policy or practice of providing light duty, subject to
availability, for any employee who cannot perform one or more job
duties for up to 90 days due to injury, illness, or a condition that would
be a disability under the ADA. An employee requests a light duty
assignment for a 20-pound lifting restriction related to her pregnancy.
The employer denies the light duty request, claiming that pregnancy
itself does not constitute an injury, illness, or disability, and that the
employee has not provided any evidence that the restriction is the result
of a pregnancy-related impairment that constitutes a disability under the
ADA. The employer has violated the PDA because the employer’s
policy treats pregnant employees differently from other employees
82
similar in their ability or inability to work.

Accordingly, the Commission’s position is not that reasonable
accommodation of pregnancy is independently required, but that an
employer who provides reasonable accommodation to disabled workers is
required to provide similar accommodation to similarly situated pregnant
workers. And, because employers are legally required to provide
reasonable accommodation to disabled workers, the dissenting
commissioners are not inaccurate in suggesting that pregnant workers may
also as a practical matter be entitled to reasonable accommodation, not
because of the Americans With Disabilities Act, but because of the
Pregnancy Discrimination Act’s dictate that “women affected by
pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions shall be treated the
same for all employment-related purposes, including receipt of benefits

81. U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, NO. 915.003, ENFORCEMENT
GUIDANCE: PREGNANCY DISCRIMINATION AND RELATED ISSUES (July 14, 2014).
82. Id.
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under fringe benefit programs, as other persons not so affected but similar
in their ability or inability to work.”83
The question is whether the Commission’s position in the guidance—
that pregnant women are entitled to the accommodations that employers
provide for disabled workers similarly situated with respect to their ability
or inability to work—is inconsistent with its prior positions on that issue.
While it is difficult to judge the assertions of inconsistency by the
dissenting commissioners when they point to no prior statements by the
Commission as evidence of its prior position, a review of the
Commission’s prior formal statements does not suggest any inconsistency.
While it is true that the General Counsel for the EEOC had apparently
taken the position in a 1966 opinion letter that the Commission would not
compare “an employer’s treatment of illness or injury with his treatment of
maternity since maternity is a temporary condition unique to the female sex
and more or less to be anticipated during the working life of most women
employees,”84 the Commission apparently rejected, or abandoned, that
view when it issued regulations in 1972 providing in part that “[d]isabilities
caused or contributed to by pregnancy, miscarriage, abortion, childbirth,
and recovery there from are, for all job-related purposes, temporary
disabilities and should be treated as such . . . .”85 Although the Supreme
Court in General Electric Co. v. Gilbert86 refused to rely on these
regulations in connection with its conclusion that discrimination on the
basis of pregnancy was not unlawful sex discrimination, the Court’s
conclusion was rejected by Congress when it enacted the Pregnancy
Discrimination Act two years later.87
The Commission published in the Federal Register on April 20, 1979,
83. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2 (2015).
84. The Supreme Court in General Electric Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 142

(1976), relied on this informal opinion letter, which generally is not viewed as
reflecting the formal views of the Commission, to reject the EEOC’s later formal
regulation equating disabilities caused by pregnancy with other temporary disabilities.
85. Guidelines on Discrimination Because of Sex, 29 C.F.R. § 1604.10(b) (1979).
See 78 Fed. Reg. 6836 (April 5, 1972).
86. 429 U.S. 125 (1976).
87. The legislative history of the Pregnancy Discrimination Act contains several
references to the EEOC’s regulations and suggests that the Court was wrong to reject
those regulations. See, e.g., Legislative History of the Pregnancy Discrimination Act of
1978, Prepared for the Committee on Labor and Human Resources, United States
Senate 2 (U.S. Government Printing Office June 1980) (statement of Senator Williams)
(noting that Court rejected the EEOC guidelines, promulgated by the “agency which
the Congress, in passing Title VII, vested with primary responsibility for implementing
the law” in a “dramatic departure” from its previous policy of giving those guidelines
great deference).
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within six months of the effective date of the Pregnancy Discrimination
Act, a series of questions and answers on the Pregnancy Discrimination
Act. One of those questions and answers provides as follows:
Q: If, for pregnancy-related reasons, an employee is unable to perform
the functions of her job, does the employer have to provide her an
alternative job?
A: An employer is required to treat an employee temporarily unable to
perform the functions of her job because of her pregnancy-related
condition in the same manner as it treats other temporarily disabled
employees, whether by providing modified tasks, alternative
assignments, disability leaves, leaves without pay, etc. For example, a
woman’s primary job function may be the operation of a machine, and,
incidental to that function, she may carry materials to and from the
machine. If other employees temporarily unable to lift are relieved or
these functions, pregnant employees also unable to lift must be
88
temporarily relieved of the function.

This exchange would suggest that the Commission took a position in the
very early days of the Pregnancy Discrimination Act that employers must
treat pregnant women in the same manner as they treat similarly situated
disabled employees, including by providing accommodations for lifting and
other job functions to pregnant women that they provide to other disabled
employees. Of course, there is no reference of this exchange to employees
who meet the definition of “disability” in the Americans With Disabilities
Act because this exchange was published more than ten years before
enactment of the ADA.
The Commission also seems to have taken the position that women
disabled by pregnancy must be treated in the same manner as other
disabled workers in its more informal pronouncements on the meaning of
the Pregnancy Discrimination Act. In a fact sheet on pregnancy
discrimination contained on the EEOC’s website, which indicates that it
was last modified on March 19, 2011, more than three years before the
EEOC issued its most recent guidance and almost a year before the
Commission began the process that culminated in the guidance, the
Commission took the position that “[i]f an employee is temporarily unable
to perform her job due to pregnancy, the employer must treat her the same
as any other temporarily disabled employee; for example, by providing

88. Appendix to Part 1604 – Questions and Answers on the Pregnancy
Discrimination Act, PUB. L., NO. 95-555, § 1604, 92 Stat. 2076 (1978), 44 Fed. Reg.
23805 (April 20, 1979).
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light duty, modified tasks, alternative assignments, disability leave, or leave
without pay.”89 That the Commission is not suggesting that this obligation
is imposed on employers only if the woman affected by pregnancy would
independently meet the definition of disability under the ADA is made
clear in the next paragraph of the fact sheet, in which the Commission
discussed the additional duty imposed on employers to provide reasonable
accommodations to employees who have a disability related to pregnancy
that meets the definition of disability under the ADA.90 As an example of
such an accommodation, the fact sheet noted that “an employer may be
required to provide modified duties for an employee with a 20-pound
lifting restriction stemming from pregnancy related sciatica, absent undue
hardship.”91 The structure of the fact sheet, as well as the use of the term
“additionally” to introduce the paragraph on pregnancy-related disabilities
that are covered under the ADA, makes clear the Commission’s position
that accommodation, including light duty, is required of employers even
with respect to pregnant woman who do not meet the definition of
“disability” under the ADA. This fact sheet would seem to refute the
statement of the dissenting commissioners that the 2014 guidance
constitutes a break from any contrary “long-standing” policy on the part of
the EEOC with respect to the duty to accommodate pregnant women.
Nor can the EEOC’s use of the phrase “any other temporarily disabled
employee” in the March 19, 2011 fact sheet have been intended to refer
only to employees who do not meet the definition of “disability” under the
ADA, so as to preclude a claim by a temporarily disabled pregnant woman
that she was entitled to be treated in the same manner as an employee that
does meet that definition. Contemporaneously with the publication of this
fact sheet, the EEOC issued formal regulations interpreting the term
“disability” under the Americans With Disabilities Act, as amended by the
Americans With Disabilities Act Amendments Act of 2008, to include
impairments that are temporary in nature, including impairments expected
to last up to six months.92 Accordingly, the position of the EEOC in its fact
89. U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Fact Sheet on Pregnancy
Discrimination (March 19, 2011), http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/publications/index.cfm
[hereinafter Fact Sheet on Pregnancy Discrimination].
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. See Regulations to Implement the Equal Employment Provisions of the
Americans with Disabilities Act, 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2 (j)(1)(ix) (March 25, 2011) (“The
effects of an impairment lasting or expected to last fewer than six months can be
substantially limiting within the meaning of this section”). The Commission also
indicated when it promulgated those regulations that its “long-standing position” had
been that if an impairment was expected to substantially limit a major life activity for at
least several months, it could be a disability under the Act. 76 Fed. Reg. 16978, 16982
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sheet would seem to suggest that the EEOC believes, and believed before
the issuance of its most recent guidance, that employers who provide
accommodations to temporarily disabled employees, regardless of whether
those employees are statutorily entitled to reasonable accommodation
under the ADA, are also required to provide accommodation to pregnant
women who have similar restrictions on their ability to work as those other
temporarily disabled employees. The EEOC’s use of the word “any” to
modify temporarily disabled employees would seem to refute the
contention that employers can escape the duty to accommodate pregnant
women as long as they also refuse to accommodate at least one other
category of employees with a temporary disability, such as employees
injured off the job. In any event, the fact sheet gives no hint that the EEOC
considers the source of the injury to be relevant in any way to the duty to
accommodate temporarily disabled employees.
Accordingly, the criticisms of the guidance by the dissenting members of
the EEOC are largely without merit. The Young Court majority’s criticism
that the EEOC has now taken a position inconsistent with the view
previously taken by the government is also suspect; one might think that
there was a difference between the deference given to a position that the
government takes as a litigant, in defending against challenges to its
practices as an employer, and the position taken by the expert agency
charged with the enforcement of a statute. In addition, although the Court
is accurate in suggesting that the EEOC has perhaps gone further in
addressing an issue that it had not previously addressed, it is not clear why
the EEOC should be faulted for attempting to address an issue of statutory
construction on which its previous guidance and regulations were not
entirely clear.
V. WHAT THE PREGNANCY DISCRIMINATION ACT SAYS ABOUT THE
COMPARATIVE TREATMENT OF WOMEN AFFECTED BY PREGNANCY
The language of the Pregnancy Discrimination Act is consistent with the
position of the EEOC that employers who provide accommodation to
temporarily disabled employees, including but not limited to employees

(March 25, 2011). The Commission in its interpretative guidance issued at the same
time as the regulations gave the following example of a temporarily disabled employee
who would be entitled to the protections of the Act: “if an individual has a back
impairment that results in a 20-pound lifting restriction that lasts for several months, he
is substantially limited in the major life activity of lifting, and therefore covered under
the first prong of the definition of disability.” Interpretive Guidance on Title I of the
Americans With Disabilities Act, 29 C.F.R. 1630 App. (2015). The EEOC’s regulation
has been upheld by the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit in
Summers v. Altarum Instrument Corp., 740 F.3d 325 (4th Cir. 2014).
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with temporary disabilities protected by the Americans With Disabilities
Act, are also required to provide those accommodations to women
temporarily disabled by pregnancy. After all, the Act, which, in addition to
making clear that discrimination on the basis of pregnancy is sex
discrimination, also specifies that “women affected by pregnancy,
childbirth, or related medical conditions shall be treated the same for all
employment-related purposes, including receipt of benefits under fringe
benefit programs, as other persons not so affected but similar in their ability
or inability to work.” Temporarily disabled workers, regardless of whether
they qualify as an “individual with a disability” under the ADA, would
appear to be in the category of persons “not so affected but similar in their
ability or inability to work,” as long as the effects of their temporary
disabilities affected their ability to work ways similar to the ways in which
pregnant women are affected in their ability to work.
Of course, the term “other persons” in the statute is not modified by an
adjective, in that the statutory language does not say either “any other
person” or “all other persons,” so it does not directly address the question
of whether employers are required to extend to pregnant women the
treatment that they provide to any similarly situated person or whether they
are required to extend to pregnant women only the treatment that they
provide to all similarly situated persons. In the oral arguments for Young v.
United Parcel Service, Inc., Justice Scalia referred to the argument that
employers are required to extend to pregnant women the treatment that they
provide to any similarly situated person as “most favored nation”
treatment,93 while Justice Ginsburg referred to the argument that employers
are required to extend protection to pregnant women that they extend only
to all similarly situated persons as “least favored nation” treatment.94
Given the ambiguity in the statutory language, the next question is
whether the meaning of this ambiguous language might be resolved by the
legislative history of the statute. Even though the legislative history does
not definitively resolve this issue, that legislative history is helpful in
determining the intent of Congress in enacting this statute. The legislative
history of the statute appears to be more consistent with, in the language
used by Justices Scalia and Ginsburg in the Young v. United Parcel
Service, Inc. oral argument, granting pregnant women “most favored
nation” status rather than “least favored nation” status.
Because the Pregnancy Discrimination Act was a direct response to the
93. Transcript of Oral Argument, Young v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., No. 12-1226,
p. 5, lines 19-20, p. 13, lines 22-25, p. 16, lines 15-18 (Scalia, J.). Justice Breyer also
used the phrase “most favored nation” in his questions during oral argument. Id. at p.
7, lines 7-8, p. 16, lines 21-22 (Breyer, J.).
94. Id. at p. 46, lines 7-10 (Ginsburg, J.).
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Court’s decision in Gilbert, the focus of Congress in enacting the statute
appears to have been the holding of the Court in the context of the factual
situation raised by that case—whether women affected by pregnancy and
childbirth could be excluded from a disability program for nonoccupational conditions. Accordingly, in several places in the legislative
history, members of the House of Representatives and the Senate did
indicate that employers who provide a disability program “must treat
disability due to pregnancy or any related medical conditions the same as
all other nonwork-related disability with respect to the payment of benefits
and to the provision of leave policies.”95 The strongest language in favor of
such an approach indicated that the Act “would not require extending
coverage beyond job-related disability if that is all the existing coverage
provides.”96 Although this language does not, of course, directly address
the question of whether employers are required to provide accommodations
to pregnant women if they provide such accommodations to employees
suffering from any disability or only other non-work-related disabilities,
this language at least provides some support for the position that members
of Congress were suggesting that they thought that the proper comparator
for women affected by pregnancy was another employee affected by some
other type of non-work-related disability.
The legislative history of the Pregnancy Discrimination Act, however,
provides more evidence that members of Congress thought that the proper
comparator for women affected by pregnancy was any disabled worker
affected in the same or similar ways as such women, regardless of whether
the disability of that other worker was work-related or non-work-related.
The Senate Report on the bill that would become the Pregnancy
95. Legislative History of the Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978, Prepared for
the Committee on Labor and Human Resources, United States Senate 8 (U.S.
Government Printing Office June 1980) (statement of Senator Brooke); id. at 125 (“It
simply requires that if coverage or benefits are given that any disability due to
pregnancy must be treated the same as any other non-work-related disability.”)
(statement of Senator Biden); id. at 133 (“it requires those employers who do provide
disability coverage to treat pregnancy-related disabilities the same as any other nonwork related disability with regard to benefits and leave policies”) (statement of
Senator Culver); id. at 170 (“Providing pregnancy disability benefits as a required part
of a non-work-related disability packages encourages working women to have
children.”) (statement of Representative Sarasin). Similar statements are contained in
the Fact Sheet on S. 995. Id. at 22 (“It will simply require employers who do provide a
disability plan to treat disability due to pregnancy or a related medical condition the
same as any other non-work-related disability with respect to benefits and leave
policies.”).
96. Legislative History of the Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978, Prepared for
the Committee on Labor and Human Resources, United States Senate 168 (U.S.
Government Printing Office June 1980) (statement of Senator Sarasin).
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Discrimination Act stated broadly that:
By defining sex discrimination to include discrimination against
pregnant women, the bill rejects the view that employers may treat
pregnancy and its incidents as sui generis, without regard to its
functional comparability to other conditions. Under this bill, the
treatment of pregnant women in covered employment must focus not on
their condition alone but on the actual effects of that condition on their
ability to work. Pregnant women who are able to work must be
permitted to work on the same conditions as other employees; and when
they are not able to work for medical reasons, they must be accorded the
same rights, leave privileges and other benefits, as other workers who are
97
disabled from working.

The Report went on to indicate, with respect to the issue of disability
benefits, that the bill would prohibit employers from “treating pregnancy
and childbirth differently from other causes of disability.”98
This language clearly suggests not only that it is the functional aspects of
the disabilities of pregnant women and other disabled workers that is the
proper basis for comparison, but that women whose functional ability to
work is impaired by their pregnancy or related conditions must be provided
the same rights and benefits as other disabled workers. Other statements
made while the Act was being considered by the Senate also indicate that
the provisions of the Act go beyond the issue of fringe benefits to require
that employers treat women affected by pregnancy in the same manner with
respect to employment conditions generally as they treat other conditions
that cause inability to work. Senator Jarvis indicated that the “bill would
prohibit as sex discrimination any personnel practice, fringe benefit
program or other employment related action which treats pregnancy or
pregnancy-related conditions differently than other conditions which also
cause inability to work for limited periods.”99 Senator Stafford indicated
that “[w]hen an employer treats pregnancy, childbirth, and related
conditions the same as he treats any other disabling condition, then he has
complied with the bill.”100
Similarly, the House Report on the bill also emphasized that the
97. S. REP. NO. 95-331, reproduced in Legislative History of the Pregnancy
Discrimination Act of 1978, Prepared for the Committee on Labor and Human
Resources, United States Senate 41 (U.S. Government Printing Office June 1980).
98. Id.
99. Legislative History of the Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978, Prepared for
the Committee on Labor and Human Resources, United States Senate 67 (U.S.
Government Printing Office June 1980) (statement of Senator Jarvis).
100. Id. at 83 (statement of Senator Stafford).
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comparative treatment that the bill would require of employers focuses on
the ability or inability of pregnant women to work, not on other factors,
such as the source or cause of that functional inability. That report, in the
section on “Basic Principles,” provided:
The bill would simply require that pregnant women be treated the same
as other employees on the basis of their ability or inability to work. The
“same treatment” may include employer practices of transferring
workers to lighter assignments, requiring employees to be examined by
company doctors or other practices, as long as the requirements and
benefits are administered equally for all workers in terms of their actual
101
ability to perform work.

The House Report went on to specify that the bill would prohibit
employers from treating pregnancy and related medical conditions “in a
manner different from their treatment of other disabilities” and that the bill
would require such women to “be provided the same benefits as those
provided other disabled workers.”102 Certainly there is no suggestion in
this language that some disabilities are entitled to more favored status with
respect to employment than others.
This understanding of the bill is echoed in the discussion of the bill in
the House of Representatives. Representative Green indicated that “this
legislation, which requires that pregnant women be treated the same as
other employees on the basis of their ability or inability to work—will help
provide equal employment opportunities for millions of women—the goal
of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.”103 Representative Akaka
described the bill as requiring that “employers treat disabilities arising from
pregnancy just as any other disability.”104
Other aspects of the legislative history also support a reading of the
statutory language that requires women affected by pregnancy to be treated
like employers treat other employees who have functional limitations on
their ability to work, regardless of the source of that limitation, such as
whether it has a work-related cause, is considered a “voluntary” condition,
101. H. R. REP. NO. 95-948, reproduced in Legislative History of the Pregnancy
Discrimination Act of 1978, Prepared for the Committee on Labor and Human
Resources, United States Senate 150-51 (U.S. Government Printing Office June 1980).
102. Id. at 151.
103. Legislative History of the Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978, Prepared for
the Committee on Labor and Human Resources, United States Senate 172 (U.S.
Government Printing Office June 1980) (statement of Representative Green).
104. Legislative History of the Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978, Prepared for
the Committee on Labor and Human Resources, United States Senate 177 (U.S.
Government Printing Office June 1980) (statement of Representative Akaka).

http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/jgspl/vol24/iss1/3

28

: Disparate Impact and Pregnancy
HEBERT 10/8/15 (DO NOT DELETE)

2015]

12/4/15 11:05 AM

DISPARATE IMPACT AND PREGNANCY

135

or is based on another “neutral” distinction that would operate to the
disadvantage of women affected by pregnancy. The Senate sponsor of the
bill indicated that “[t]he entire thrust behind this legislation . . . is to
guarantee women the basic right to participate fully and equally in the work
force, without denying them the fundamental right to full participation in
family life.”105 Other members of Congress who spoke in support of the
bill indicated that it would “protect the income of millions of working
women to the benefit of their families”106 and that it would “facilitate a
woman’s choice to conceive and bear children without facing undue
economic hardships.”107 If women affected by pregnancy can be treated
worse than other employees simply because of the source of their
impairment or other seemingly neutral classification and thereby be
deprived of opportunities to maintain their employment and financial
benefits, those results would appear to be inconsistent with the stated
purposes of the legislation.
VI. THE VIABILITY OF DISPARATE IMPACT CLAIMS BASED ON
PREGNANCY
Even before Congress overruled the Court’s conclusion in Gilbert that
intentional discrimination on the basis of pregnancy was not sex
discrimination, the Court had recognized that disparate impact claims could
be maintained with respect to classifications based on pregnancy. In a
decision issued a year after the Gilbert decision, the Court in Nashville Gas
Co. v. Satty108 held that the employer’s policy of denying accumulated
seniority to women returning from pregnancy leave violated Title VII
because, even though “neutral in its treatment of male and female
employees,”109 the employer’s practice imposed a substantial burden on
women and not men with respect to their employment opportunities that
had not been justified by business necessity.110
The question has been raised as to whether Congress in adopting the
105. Legislative History of the Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978, Prepared for
the Committee on Labor and Human Resources, United States Senate 117 (U.S.
Government Printing Office June 1980) (statement of Senator Williams).
106. Legislative History of the Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978, Prepared for
the Committee on Labor and Human Resources, United States Senate 177 (U.S.
Government Printing Office June 1980) (statement of Representative Quie).
107. Legislative History of the Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978, Prepared for
the Committee on Labor and Human Resources, United States Senate 178 (U.S.
Government Printing Office June 1980) (statement of Senator Corrado).
108. 434 U.S. 136 (1977).
109. Id. at 140.
110. Id. at 141-43.
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Pregnancy Discrimination Act eliminated the possibility of challenging
classifications based on pregnancy under the disparate impact theory. This
claim was made by the dissenting justices in the Guerra case, who asserted
in a footnote that the statutory language requiring that women affected by
pregnancy be treated “the same” as other workers precluded not only the
California statute requiring “preferential” treatment of such women but also
precluded claims of disparate impact based on pregnancy:
The same clear language preventing preferential treatment based on
pregnancy forecloses respondents’ argument that the California
provision can be upheld as a legislative response to leave policies that
have a disparate impact on pregnant workers. Whatever remedies Title
VII would otherwise provide for victims of disparate impact, Congress
expressly ordered pregnancy to be treated in the same manner as other
111
disabilities.

The majority of the Court in Guerra found it unnecessary to address the
issue of whether the California statute “could be upheld as a legislative
response to leave policies that have a disparate impact on pregnant
workers.”112 But the rest of the majority’s decision is not agnostic on the
continuing viability of a disparate impact claim based on pregnancy.
Indeed, when the majority discussed the effect of the Pregnancy
Discrimination Act on Title VII, it expressly noted the purpose of Title VII
is to “achieve equality of opportunities and remove barriers,” citing to the
Court’s decision in Griggs v. Duke Power Co.,113 the seminal disparate
impact case, and noted that “[r]ather than limiting existing Title VII

111. Cal. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272, 298 n.1 (1987) (White,
J., dissenting). Curiously, elsewhere in the dissent, Justice White emphasized
legislative history indicating that the Pregnancy Discrimination Act “did not mark a
departure from Title VII principles.” Id. at 299. Justice White took the same approach
in his concurring opinion in the Johnson Controls decision, discussed in text
accompanying notes 33 to 40, supra. There, he stressed that the legislative history of
the Pregnancy Discrimination Act indicated that “‘the purpose of the PDA was simply
to make the treatment of pregnancy consistent with general Title VII principles’” and
that distinctions based on pregnancy “‘will be subject to the same scrutiny on the same
terms as other acts of sex discrimination.’” UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 U.S.
187, 218-19 (1991) (White, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment)
(emphasis in original). Reading the Pregnancy Discrimination Act as eliminating
claims of disparate impact based on pregnancy, however, would constitute a marked
departure from normal Title VII principles and would not treat claims of pregnancy
discrimination in the same manner as other claims of sex discrimination.
112. Guerra, 479 U.S. at 292 n.32.
113. 401 U.S. 424, 429-30 (1971).
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principles and objectives, the PDA extends them to cover pregnancy.”114
The majority’s analysis seems to directly refute the claim by the dissent
that the Pregnancy Discrimination Act was intended to cut back on the
general principles and theories of discrimination under Title VII in general
or the disparate impact theory in particular.
For there to be any validity to the Guerra dissent’s suggestion that the
Pregnancy Discrimination Act eliminated disparate impact claims based on
pregnancy, it would be necessary to find that Congress in enacting the
Pregnancy Discrimination Act intended not only to overrule Gilbert, but
also that it intended to overrule Satty, which relied on the disparate impact
theory to invalidate the employer’s policy of denying accumulated seniority
to women returning from maternity leave. But there is absolutely no
support in the Pregnancy Discrimination Act for such a conclusion. While
members of Congress made frequent and unfavorable comments about the
Supreme Court’s decision in Gilbert, they barely mentioned the Court’s
decision in Satty. One of the few references in the legislative history to the
Satty case, contained in the House Report,115 makes clear the understanding
that Satty was applying the disparate impact theory to a claim of pregnancy
discrimination. Although that reference contains some criticism of the
Court’s analysis in that case—in that it suggested that the distinction made
in Satty between nonactionable “benefits” and actionable “burdens” would
be difficult to apply—it contained no indication that Congress desired to
overrule that case. Instead, what the House Report says is that enactment
of the Pregnancy Discrimination Act “would eliminate the need in most
instances to rely on the impact approach, and thus would obviate the
difficulties in applying the distinctions created in Satty.”116 This language
clearly indicates that disparate impact claims concerning pregnancy would
survive the enactment of the Pregnancy Discrimination Act and such a
claim might still be relevant in some instances in which a claim of explicit
intentional discrimination might not be cognizable.
Congress’ consideration of the Conference Report reconciling the
different versions of the Pregnancy Discrimination Act passed by the
Senate and the House makes even more explicit that the Court’s decision in
Satty survives enactment of that statute. Senator Williams, in explaining
114. Guerra, 479 U.S. at 288-89.
115. H. R. REP. NO. 95-948, reproduced in Legislative History of the Pregnancy

Discrimination Act of 1978, Prepared for the Committee on Labor and Human
Resources, United States Senate 152 (U.S. Government Printing Office June 1980).
116. Id. at 149, 154 (noting that “[m]any, if not all” employment policies not
involving fringe benefits, including “refusing to hire pregnant women, firing women
who became pregnant, denying seniority, and forcing women to take mandatory
maternity leave” are “presumably invalid under present law as interpreted in Satty”).
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the Conference Report, noted that the Satty Court had invalidated the denial
of seniority to women taking leaves based on pregnancy under Title VII
and indicated that “[t]his legislation, then, will insure that favorable
decisions such as the decision with regard to seniority in the Satty case, will
be preserved, as well as insuring that other forms of sex discrimination
against women affected by pregnancy will not be permitted.”117
Recent decisions by the Supreme Court also indicate that disparate
impact claims based on pregnancy continue to have viability. Although the
Court majority in Young v. United Parcel Service, Inc. made it clear that it
was addressing only the disparate treatment theory in that case, the Court
noted that Young had not brought a disparate impact claim. The Court did
not suggest that she could not have brought such a claim nor that there was
any reason why the disparate impact theory, which the Court noted was
cognizable under employment discrimination law,118 would not apply to
pregnancy discrimination claims. Even Justice Scalia, not a friend to the
disparate impact theory,119 seemed to acknowledge in his dissent in Young
that disparate impact claims based on pregnancy could be asserted.120
Justice Kennedy in his separate dissent went even further, expressly noting
that the Pregnancy Discrimination Act “forbids not only disparate treatment
but also disparate impact, the latter of which prohibits ‘practices that are
not intended to discriminate, but nonetheless have a disproportionate

117. Legislative History of the Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978, Prepared for
the Committee on Labor and Human Resources, United States Senate 201 (U.S.
Government Printing Office June 1980) (statement of Senator Williams).
118. Young v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 575 U.S. __, 135 S. Ct. 1338, 1345 (2015).
119. In addition to challenging the notion that Congress meant to include disparate
impact within statutory schemes, as indicated by his joining of the dissent in the
Inclusive Communities Project case, Justice Scalia has suggested that even when
Congress indisputably did include that theory, its action in doing so might be
unconstitutional as a violation of equal protection. He indicated in his dissenting
opinion in Ricci v. DeStefano that the Court’s resolution of the issue before it “merely
postpones the evil day on which the Court will have to confront the question: Whether,
or to what extent, are the disparate-impact provisions of Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964 consistent with the Constitution’s guarantee of equal protection?” 557
U.S. 557, 594 (2009) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
120. Justice Scalia in his dissent in Young, joined by Justices Thomas and Kennedy,
noted as follows: “Title VII’s prohibition of discrimination creates liability for both
disparate treatment (taking action with ‘discriminatory motive’) and disparate impact
(using a practice that ‘fall[s] more harshly on one group than another and cannot be
justified by business necessity’).
Peggy Young did not establish pregnancy
discrimination under either theory.” Young, 135 S. Ct. at 1361 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
His opinion certainly does not suggest that it was not open to her to attempt to establish
pregnancy discrimination under the disparate impact theory.

http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/jgspl/vol24/iss1/3

32

: Disparate Impact and Pregnancy
HEBERT 10/8/15 (DO NOT DELETE)

2015]

12/4/15 11:05 AM

DISPARATE IMPACT AND PREGNANCY

139

adverse effect.’”121
The Court’s recent decision concluding that disparate impact claims can
be brought under the Fair Housing Act, Texas Department of Housing and
Community Affairs v. Inclusive Communities Project, Inc.,122 eliminates the
validity of any assertion that the statutory terms “because of” or “on the
basis of” incorporate a requirement of intent to discriminate inconsistent
with the foundation of the disparate impact theory; the majority in that case
expressly rejected such a claim by the dissent in that case.123 One might
have thought that that issue had been resolved by the Court’s unanimous
decision in Griggs v. Duke Power Co.,124 but neither its almost four and
one-half decades as precedent nor its express codification by Congress into
the text of Title VII125 have deterred four members of the present Court
from trumpeting what they see as its invalidity.126
121. Id. at 1367 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
122. 576 U.S. __, No. 1301371, 2015 WL 2473449 (June 25, 2015).
123. In his dissent in that case, Justice Alito argued that the use of the phrase

“because of” in the Fair Housing Act imports a requirement of intent: “Under a statute
like the FHA that prohibits actions taken ‘because of’ protected characteristics, intent
makes all the difference. Disparate impact, however, does not turn on ‘subjective
intent.’” Inclusive Communities Project, Inc., 2015 WL 2473449, at *25 (Alito, J.,
dissenting) (citing Raytheon Co. v. Hernandez, 540 U.S. 44, 53 (2003)). The majority
of the Court, in an opinion written by Justice Kennedy and joined by Justices Ginsburg,
Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan, rejected that assertion, concluding that the FHA, like
Title VII and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act before it, includes the
disparate impact theory within its scope, despite the use of the phrase “because of”:
Emphasizing that the FHA uses the phrase “because of race,” the
Department argues this language forecloses disparate impact liability since
“[a]n action is not taken ‘because of race’ unless race is a reason for the
action. Griggs and Smith, however, dispose of this argument. Both Title
VII and the ADEA contain identical “because of” language, and the Court
nonetheless held those statutes impose disparate-impact liability.
Inclusive Communities Project, Inc., 2015 WL 2473449, at *10. What Justice Alito
apparently fails to comprehend is that “because of” imports a requirement of causation,
not intent, into these three statutes. A practice with a disparate impact on the basis of
race or other protected characteristic is caused by that protected characteristic just as
much as a practice that is intentionally motivated by that protected characteristic.
124. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
125. In the Civil Rights Act of 1991, Congress expressly provided that the purposes
of the Act were to “confirm statutory authority and provide statutory guidelines for the
adjudication of disparate impact suits” and to “codify the concepts of ‘business
necessity’ and ‘job related’ enunciated by the Supreme Court in Griggs v. Duke Power
Co.” and other Supreme Court decisions. Civil Rights Act of 1991, PUB. L. NO. 102166, § 3, 105 Stat. 1071 (1991).
126. Justice Thomas in his dissent in the Inclusive Communities Project, Inc. case
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In addition to the Supreme Court cases that make clear that disparate
impact claims are cognizable under the Pregnancy Discrimination Act,
lower courts have also reached that conclusion.127 For example, the United
States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois in Crnokrak v.
Evangelical Health Systems Corp.128 addressed the possible concern that
the Act’s mandate that pregnant women be treated the same as similarly
situated employees precluded reliance on the disparate impact theory. The
court indicated that the Pregnancy Discrimination Act did not alter the
“general framework” of Title VII, which it recognized made both disparate
treatment and disparate impact claims cognizable. The court noted that a
conclusion that an employer’s leave policies were immune from attack as
long as they treated pregnant women like everybody else would mean that
the Act “would have expanded the rights of some pregnant women
asserting disparate treatment claims only to abrogate the rights of other
pregnant women asserting disparate impact claims.”129 The court noted
that, in light of the purpose of the Pregnancy Discrimination Act to extend
protection to pregnant women, “it is hardly possible the Congress sought to
strip pregnant women of rights that they formerly had been granted” and
that, instead, Congress recognized that “in some cases ‘equality cannot be
achieved by treating identically those who are not alike.’” 130
The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit in Scherr v.
Woodland School Community Consolidated District131 also rejected the
contention that disparate impact claims were not available under the
Pregnancy Discrimination Act. The court of appeals noted that arguments
against disparate impact claims on the basis of pregnancy were in error
because they treated the Pregnancy Discrimination Act as an “independent
indicates that “[w]e should drop the pretense that Griggs’ interpretation of Title VII
was legitimate,” Inclusive Communities Project Inc., 2015 WL 2473449, at *18
(Thomas, J., dissenting), and asserts that Griggs “shows that our disparate-impact
jurisprudence was erroneous from its inception,” id. at *23. Justice Alito in his dissent
is a little less direct in his challenge to Griggs, but complains about the confusion
caused by what he calls the Griggs Court’s “text-free reasoning,” id. at *34-35 (Alito,
J., dissenting).
127. See, e.g., Smith v. F.W. Morse & Co., 76 F.3d 413, 420 (1st Cir. 1996) (“Like
other Title VII plaintiffs, an employee claiming discrimination on the basis of
pregnancy may proceed under either a disparate treatment or a disparate impact
theory.”).
128. 819 F. Supp. 737 (N.D. Ill. 1993).
129. Id. at 741.
130. Id. at 742 (quoting Melissa Feinberg, After California Federal Savings & Loan
Association v. Guerra: the Parameters of the Pregnancy Discrimination Act, 31 ARIZ.
L. REV. 141, 146 (1989)).
131. 867 F.2d 974 (7th Cir. 1988).
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statutory enactment” rather than “an amendment to a highly developed
statutory scheme” in response to the Supreme Court’s decision in
Gilbert.132 The court reasoned that the Pregnancy Discrimination Act does
not contain its own substantive rules for pregnancy discrimination claims,
but instead “finds force” through the substantive sections of the statute,
which prohibit both disparate treatment and disparate impact.133
Accordingly, the court said, a claim of pregnancy discrimination could be
based on either theory, just like any other claim of discrimination under
Title VII.134 The court went on to explain why the text of the statute,
requiring the “same” treatment, was not inconsistent with application of the
disparate impact theory. The court noted that the context in which the
Pregnancy Discrimination Act was enacted involved the pervasiveness of
discrimination against pregnancy, particularly in disability and health
insurance programs:
In this context, it is clear that the statutory requirement that pregnancy
receive the “same” treatment as other disabilities was not intended as an
ultimate end, but as a means of assuring that pregnancy would not be
excluded, as it was in Gilbert, from any list of compensable disabilities.
Moreover, interpreting “same” to mean “identical” would go against
“[t]he entire thrust . . . behind this legislation [which] is to guarantee
women the basic right to participate fully and equally in the workforce,
without denying them the fundamental right to full participation in
135
family life.”

The court of appeals noted that because of the holding of Gilbert that
pregnancy-based classifications were facially neutral rather than facially
discriminatory, the disparate impact theory had to be used to challenge
practices that facially discriminated on the basis of pregnancy, as in the
Satty case. The court said that a correct understanding of the Pregnancy
Discrimination Act makes clear that the Act did not abolish disparate
impact claims for pregnancy but instead restored the theory “to its original
purpose under Title VII as a means of challenging facially neutral
employment practices that nevertheless discriminate.”136 Accordingly, the
court of appeals concluded that the disparate impact theory could be used
to challenge discrimination with respect to terms and conditions of

132.
133.
134.
135.
136.

Id. at 978.
Id.
Id. at 978-79.
Id. at 979 (citations and footnotes omitted).
Id. at 980.
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employment, including the leave policy at issue in that case.137
VII. THE DUTY OF EMPLOYERS TO ACCOMMODATE PREGNANCY UNDER
THE DISPARATE IMPACT THEORY
The EEOC’s recent guidance on pregnancy discrimination says
relatively little about claims of disparate impact on the basis of pregnancy.
In its section on “Evaluating PDA-Covered Employment Decisions,” the
guidance contains the following explanation of claims of disparate impact
under the Pregnancy Discrimination Act:
Title VII is violated if a facially neutral policy has a disproportionate
adverse effect on women affected by pregnancy, childbirth, or related
medical conditions and the employer cannot show that the policy is job
related for the position in question and consistent with business
necessity. Proving disparate impact ordinarily requires a statistical
showing that a specific employment practice has a discriminatory effect
on workers in the protected group. However, statistical evidence might
not be required if it could be shown that all or substantially all pregnant
women would be negatively affected by the challenged policy.
The employer can prove business necessity by showing that the
requirement is “necessarily to safe and efficient job performance.” If the
employer makes this showing, a violation still can be found if there is a
less discriminatory alternative that meets the business need and the
employer refuses to adopt it. The disparate impact provisions of Title
VII have been used by pregnant plaintiffs to challenge, for example,
weight lifting requirements, light duty limitations, and restrictive leave
138
policies.

Beyond noting that disparate impact claims can be asserted in the context
of pregnancy and the types of challenges under the disparate impact theory
that plaintiffs affected by pregnancy have sought to make, the EEOC’s
recent guidance offers little guidance to either employees or employers on
what the disparate impact theory might require of employers as far as
accommodation of pregnancy and related conditions is concerned.139 But a
137. Id.
138. U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, NO. 915.003, ENFORCEMENT

GUIDANCE ON PREGNANCY DISCRIMINATION AND RELATED ISSUES (June 25, 2015)
(footnotes omitted). The guidance also states in separate sections that policies of
restricting light duty assignments and of restricting leave might have a disparate impact
and provides examples of such instances.
139. The EEOC’s failure in its recent guidance to provide more clarification about
the role of the disparate impact theory in challenging pregnancy discrimination and the
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study of the requirements of claims of disparate impact in the context of
pregnancy suggests that employers might indeed face liability for failing to
make accommodations to pregnant employees, even if they do not offer
those accommodations to other employees.
A. The Prima Facie Case of Disparate Impact Based on Pregnancy
1.

Nature of Required Showing of Disparate Impact

In order for a plaintiff to make out a claim of disparate impact on the
basis of pregnancy, she must establish that the employer “uses a particular
employment practice that causes a disparate impact on the basis of . . .
sex.”140 Because “on the basis of sex” is expressly defined to include “on
the basis of pregnancy, childbirth, and related medical conditions,”141 a
woman affected by pregnancy can make out a prima facie case of disparate
impact by proving that the challenged employment practice had
disproportionately disadvantaged either women in general or pregnant
women in particular, because both showings would demonstrate a disparate
impact “on the basis of . . . sex” as prohibited by the statute. That is, either
a showing that an employer policy disadvantages pregnant women as
compared to non-pregnant persons or a showing that the policy
disadvantages women as compared to men would make out a cognizable
case of disparate impact under Title VII.
At least one court, however, has held that it is not sufficient for a

failure of employers to provide accommodation to the physical aspects of pregnancy is
disappointing, particularly in light of the hash that lower courts have made of such
claims, as discussed below. This failure is more surprising given that as long ago as
2012, the EEOC was advised that it could play a critical role in providing clarification
to this critical issue. In a hearing held on February 15, 2012 to discuss issues
concerning pregnancy and caregiver discrimination, the EEOC heard oral testimony
and received written testimony about the inconsistency with which the courts had
treated claims of disparate impact on the basis of pregnancy and was told that “[t]here’s
a great need for Commission guidance regarding disparate impact pregnancy
discrimination analysis.” Unlawful Discrimination Against Pregnant Workers and
Works with Caregiving Responsibilities: Written Testimony of Joan C. Williams,
Professor of Law, University of California Hastings Foundation Chair and Director,
Center for Work Life Law; Testimony of Emily Martin, National Women’s Law Center
(February 15, 2012).
140. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i)
(2015). The Supreme Court in Lewis v. City of Chicago, 560 U.S. 205, 213 (2010),
confirmed that this provision of the statute sets forth the allocation of the burden of
proof with respect to disparate impact claims and the “essential ingredients” of such a
claim. The Court also noted that if the employer does not plead and prove the elements
of the statutory defenses, “the plaintiff wins simply by showing the stated elements.”
141. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (2015).
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plaintiff to show that an employer’s policy causes a disparate impact based
on pregnancy, but instead that a plaintiff bringing a claim of disparate
impact on the basis of pregnancy must show a disparate impact on the basis
of sex: that is, the contention is that it is not sufficient to show that a
challenged employment practice disproportionately disadvantages pregnant
women as compared to non-pregnant persons, but that the practice must be
shown to disadvantage women as compared to men to be cognizable. The
United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois in United
States Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Warshawsky &
Co.142 addressed the claim of the EEOC that the employer’s policy of
providing no sick leave to employees until they had worked at least one
year violated the disparate impact theory. The district court rejected the
EEOC’s comparison of the proportion of pregnant women discharged
because of the policy with the non-pregnant persons discharged under the
policy.143
The court indicated that the Pregnancy Discrimination Act did not create
a cause of action for pregnancy discrimination, but only made clear that
discrimination on the basis of pregnancy was a form of sex
discrimination.144
Accordingly, the district court said, the proper
comparison was the relative effect of the policy on women and men, not
pregnant and non-pregnant persons.145 That court did, however, recognize
that a restrictive leave policy would cause pregnant employees to be
discharged at a significantly higher rate than non-pregnant employees
precisely because pregnant employees need more time off work than nonpregnant employees.146 And, the court said, “[b]ecause only women can
get pregnant, if an employer denies adequate disability leave across the
board, women will be disproportionately affected.”147
The Warshawsky court’s analysis is subject to challenge. It may be
generally true that a policy that falls disproportionately on pregnant women
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.

768 F. Supp. 647 (N.D. Ill. 1991).
Id. at 658.
Id. at 656.
Id. at 651-54.
Id. at 654. The district court rejected the employer’s claim that the proper
comparison was between all pregnant first-year employees who needed leave and all
non-pregnant first-year employees who needed leave. The court said that such a
comparison did not take into account the different impact of the leave policy on
pregnant and non-pregnant employees, which is the essence of a disparate impact
claim. The court noted that under the employer’s theory of the proper comparison, the
Griggs Court would have compared “all black applicants who did not have a high
school diploma and all white applicants who did not have a high school diploma.” Id.
at 652.
147. Id. at 654.
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will also fall disproportionately on women as a whole, such that a prima
facie case of disparate impact can be established in either manner, at least
in most instances. But Congress in the Pregnancy Discrimination Act has
prohibited discrimination on the basis of pregnancy, not just discrimination
on the basis of sex, although, of course, discrimination on the basis of
pregnancy is a form of sex discrimination. After all, even under the
Court’s analysis in Gilbert, in which explicit classifications on the basis of
pregnancy were not considered to be sex discrimination, a plaintiff could
make out a disparate impact claim based on sex in connection with
classifications based on pregnancy, as demonstrated by the Court’s
decision in Satty. The Pregnancy Discrimination Act, which was intended
to change the rules of Gilbert, presumably means that plaintiffs making
claims of pregnancy discrimination no longer need to show disparate
impact on the basis of sex; it should be enough to show disparate impact
based on pregnancy. If the rules were otherwise, this would suggest that
while the Pregnancy Discrimination Act altered the rules that apply to
disparate treatment claims on the basis of pregnancy, it did not alter the
rules that apply to disparate impact claims on the basis of pregnancy.
There are no grounds for such a conclusion under either the language or the
legislative history of the Act. And, indeed, other courts have recognized
that in a disparate impact case under the Pregnancy Discrimination Act, a
prima facie case can be made by showing a disparate impact on pregnant
women, rather than women in general.148 The EEOC also appears to take
the position in its guidance that the relevant protected group for a disparate
impact claim based on pregnancy is women affected by pregnancy,
childbirth, or related medical conditions, not women in general.149
148. See, e.g., Davidson v. Franciscan Health Sys. of Ohio Valley, Inc., 82 F. Supp.
2d 768, 774 (S.D. Ohio 2000). See also Woodward v. Rest Haven Christian Serv., No.
07 C 0665, 2009 WL 703270, at *7 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 16, 2009) (although recognizing the
precedent in Warshawky that the proper comparison in a disparate impact case based on
pregnancy was between the effect of a policy on men and women, the court noted that
instead focusing on the comparative effect of a policy on pregnant and non-pregnant
persons “is an arguable position since the PDA defines its protected class as ‘women
affected by pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions’”).
149. U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, NO. 915.003, ENFORCEMENT
GUIDANCE ON PREGNANCY DISCRIMINATION AND RELATED ISSUES (June 25, 2015)
(“Title VII is violated if a facially neutral policy has a disproportionate adverse effect
on women affected by pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions”; also
making reference to a showing that a challenged requirement “disproportionately
excludes pregnant applicants” and that a policy “may also have a disparate impact on
pregnant workers”). Nor is this position a recently adopted one by the EEOC. In the
Warshawsky case litigated by the EEOC, the agency took the position that the relevant
protected group in a disparate impact claim based on pregnancy was pregnant women
and that the relevant statistical comparison was between pregnant and non-pregnant
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The term “disparate impact” is not defined in Title VII, so one must look
to the tests for establishing disparate impact developed by the courts, which
Congress appears to have intended to codify in the statute.150 In its original
disparate impact case, Griggs v. Duke Power Co.,151 the Court gave little
guidance on how one goes about establishing a claim of disparate impact,
instead focusing on the broader questions of whether employment practices
not motivated by discriminatory intent were cognizable under Title VII.152
The Court’s later cases have given somewhat more definition to the
requirements for proving disparate impact. In Albemarle Paper Co. v.
Moody,153 the Court referenced the requirement for proving a prima facie
case of disparate impact and indicated, in the context of that case, which
involved a claim that employment tests had a disparate impact on the basis
of race, that such a prima facie case would involve proof that “the tests in
question select applicants for hire or promotion in a racial pattern
significantly different from that of the pool of applicants.”154 In Dothard v.
Rawlinson,155 a case involving a claim that height and weight restrictions
imposed a disparate impact on the basis of gender, the Court focused more
on the requirements of a prima facie case of disparate impact. The Court
employees. 768 F. Supp. at 651-53.
150. Although Congress in its “purposes” section of the Civil Rights Act of 1991,
Pub. L. No.102-166, § 3, 105 Stat. 1071 (1991), indicated that it intended to “codify the
concepts of ‘business necessity’ and ‘job related enunciated by the Supreme Court in
Griggs v. Duke Power Co.” and later pre-Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S.
642 (1989), cases, and did not expressly indicate an intent to codify the concept of the
disparate impact prima facie case, Congress also indicated that one of its purposes was
to “confirm statutory authority and provide guidelines for the adjudication of disparate
impact suits” under Title VII. Accordingly, it appears that Congress meant to codify in
Title VII the concept of disparate impact as developed by the pre-Wards Cove cases,
except to the extent that the express statutory provisions are inconsistent with that
concept.
151. 401 U.S. 424 (1991).
152. The Court in Griggs stated broadly that that “[t]he Act proscribes not only
overt discrimination but also practices that are fair in form, but discriminatory in
operation,” id. at 431, while focusing very little on the evidence required to show
discriminatory operation. The Court cited to the concurring and dissenting opinion to
the court of appeals decision, which noted: “No one seriously questions the fact that, in
general, whites register far better on the Company’s alternative requirements than
blacks. The reasons are not mysterious.” Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 420 F.2d 1225,
1239 n.6 (4th Cir. 1970).
153. 422 U.S. 405 (1975).
154. Id. at 425. The Albemarle case, however, gave relatively little attention to the
requirements of a prima facie case, because the principal issue in that case was the
meaning of the requirement that challenged employment practices be “job related.” Id.
at 408.
155. 433 U.S. 321 (1977).
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noted that to make out a prima facie case, a plaintiff “need only show that
the facially neutral standards in question select applicants for hire in a
significant discriminatory pattern.”156 The Court rejected the employer’s
assertion that generalized national statistics were insufficient to make out a
prima facie case and that the required impact had to be shown with respect
to actual applicants for the job. The Court reasoned that plaintiffs are not
“required to exhaust every possible source of evidence, if the evidence
actually presented on its face conspicuously demonstrates a job
requirement’s grossly discriminatory impact.”157
Although Congress in the Civil Rights Act of 1991 expressly rejected the
Court’s revision in Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio158 of the burdens of
proof for disparate impact claims and its redefinition of the concepts of
business necessity, job relatedness, and less discriminatory alternatives,159
Congress seems to have approved of, and perhaps even codified in Title
VII, the standards announced in Wards Cove for establishing a prima facie
case of disparate impact. In Wards Cove, which involved challenges to a
range of employment practices on the basis of race, the Court rejected the
notion that a general showing of racial disparity in the workplace was
sufficient to establish the disparate impact of each of the challenged hiring
practices. Instead, the Court indicated that an “integral part” of the
plaintiff’s prima facie case was a showing that “it is the application of a
specific or particular employment practice that has created the disparate
impact under attack.”160 Section 703(k)(1)(B)(i), added by the Civil Rights
Act of 1991, provides that “the complaining party shall demonstrate that
each particular challenged employment practice causes a disparate impact.”
The complaining party is relieved from that burden only if he or she proves
that “the elements of a respondent’s decisionmaking process are not
capable of separation for analysis,” in which case that decisionmaking
process “may be analyzed as one employment practice.”161
In Lewis v. City of Chicago,162 the Court’s most recent case addressing
156.
157.
158.
159.

Id. at 329.
Id. at 331.
490 U.S. 642 (1989).
With respect to the concept of less discriminatory alternatives, which plaintiffs
can prove in order to counter an employer’s showing of business necessity and job
relatedness, the Civil Rights Act of 1991 enacted § 703(k)(1)(C), which provides that
that showing “shall be in accordance with the law as it existed on June 4, 1989, with
respect to the concept of ‘alternative employment practice.’” The decision of the Court
in Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio was issued on June 5, 1989.
160. Atonio, 490 U.S. at 657.
161. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(B)(i) (2015).
162. 560 U.S. 205 (2010).
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disparate impact under Title VII, a unanimous Court took an expansive
view of what type of employment practice could be challenged under the
disparate impact provisions of Title VII. That case involved a challenge to
the use of an eligibility list for firefighter candidates, based on the adoption
of a cut-off score on an examination that had an admitted disparate
impact.163 The employer claimed that only the adoption of the cut-off score
resulting in the eligibility list could be timely challenged, not the continued
use of that eligibility list over the next several years.164 The Court rejected
that argument, noting that Title VII’s disparate impact provisions define a
prima facie case as a showing that an employer “uses” a particular
“employment practice” having a disparate impact. The Court noted that the
term “employment practice” was broad enough to include not only the
adoption of a rule or policy by the employer, but also the continued “use”
of that rule or practice.165 The Court rejected the argument of the employer
that this construction of the statute should be rejected because it would
mean that employers might face disparate impact suits based on their longstanding practices; the Court concluded that “Congress allowed claims to
be brought against an employer who uses a practice that causes disparate
impact, whatever the employer’s motives and whether or not he has
employed the same practice in the past.”166
Although none of the Supreme Court’s disparate impact cases have
addressed issues of pregnancy discrimination, a number of lower courts
have addressed such claims. The approach of those courts have differed on
whether women affected by pregnancy can, or at least have, made out
claims of disparate impact, even when the challenged employment policies
involve issues that are likely to disproportionately affect pregnant women,
such as restrictive leave policies,167 lifting or other heavy physical labor

163.
164.
165.
166.

Id. at 211.
Id.
Id. at 212.
Id. at 216-17. In reaching this conclusion, the Court indicated that “it is not
our task to assess the consequences of each approach and adopt the one that produces
the least mischief. Our charge is to give effect to the law Congress enacted.” Id. at
217.
167. The references in this article to “restrictive leave policies” is intended to
convey restrictions on leave that make it difficult or impossible for women affected by
pregnancy and childbirth to maintain employment while dealing with the temporary
physical incapacities that often accompanying pregnancy and childbirth, not to refer to
any limitation on the leave provided by employers because of pregnancy and childbirth.
See Barrash v. Bowen, 846 F.2d 927, 931-32 (4th Cir. 1988) (rejecting disparate impact
claim by government employee who sought six months of leave in order to breastfeed
her child, when she was given six weeks of leave and review of medical evidence
submitted by the plaintiff did not indicate that she was incapacitated during the
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requirements, or policies that limit accommodation to instances in which an
employee has suffered an on-the-job injury.
2.

Disparate Impact Challenges to Restrictive Leave Policies

The lower courts have taken quite disparate approaches to the question
of whether pregnant women can successfully challenge policies that
severely restrict the leave that employees can take, such as in the first year
of employment,168 as a violation of the disparate impact theory. Some
courts have embraced such claims, while others seem to suggest that the
very nature of those claims may be inconsistent with the language and
purposes of the Pregnancy Discrimination Act.
The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit
in Abraham v. Graphic Arts International Union169 held that the district
court had incorrectly granted summary judgment on the plaintiff’s claim of
pregnancy discrimination. The plaintiff in that case alleged both disparate
treatment and disparate impact; her disparate impact claim was based on
her termination because she needed more than the ten days of sick leave
granted to temporary employees under the union-employer’s allegedly
pregnancy-neutral policy. The court of appeals indicated the disparate
impact that such a policy would have on women affected by pregnancy:
While a ten-day leave undoubtedly would accommodate a wide range of
temporary disabilities, it falls considerably short of the period generally
recognized in human experience as the respite needed to bear a child.
Thus, while many female as well as male employees could have held a
PEP job without any problem at all, any such jobholder confronted by
childbirth was doomed to almost certain termination. Oncoming
motherhood was virtually tantamount to dismissal, though other
indispositions might well and usually would pose no threat to continued
extended leave period sought).
168. Because of the requirements of the Family and Medical Leave Act, 29 U.S.C.
§§ 2611-19, which provides leave to employees of a covered employer after the first 12
months of employment and if the employee has worked the requisite number of hours
during that year, for not only pregnancy and childbirth but also an employee’s own
“serious health condition,” it is true that many pregnant employees, at least those
whose employers are covered by the statute, will no longer need to rely on Title VII to
challenge the failure of employers to accommodate pregnant employees with the
provision of leave. However, part-time and first-year employees, who are not entitled
to leave under the FMLA, may still need to rely on disparate impact challenges to
employer restrictive leave policies, as will those employees whose employers are not
covered by the Act. And, of course, the FMLA addresses only leave, not other
accommodations that may be needed by women during the course of their pregnancies
and after childbirth.
169. 660 F.2d 811 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
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employment. In short, a ten-day absolute ceiling on disability leave
portended a drastic effect on women employees of childbearing age an
170
impact no male would ever encounter.

The court of appeals went on to note that Title VII could be violated “by
lack of an adequate leave policy as by unequal application of a policy it
does have.”171 The court of appeals therefore remanded to the district court
for a determination of whether the employer’s policy was supported by
business necessity.172
The United States District Court for the Northern District of Mississippi,
however, rejected a similar disparate impact claim based on a limited leave
policy and its claimed impact on pregnant women in Stout v. Baxter
Healthcare Corporation.173 The plaintiff was terminated when she
incurred more than the allowed three absences during her probationary
period because she suffered a miscarriage. The district court rejected her
disparate impact claim on summary judgment for two reasons. First, the
court concluded that the statistical evidence of the disparate impact of the
policy was not “sufficiently substantial,” because of the 28 employees who
were terminated during the probationary period, while 19 were female,
only one other female other than the plaintiff was terminated because of
pregnancy.174 Second, the court concluded that the nature of the plaintiff’s
claim, that pregnant probationary employees might have to be accorded
leave even if other employees were not, was inconsistent with the
Pregnancy Discrimination Act’s mandate that pregnant women be treated
the same as other similarly situated persons.175
Interestingly, the court of appeals in Stout176 seemed to agree that the
plaintiff had provided sufficient statistical evidence of impact, seemingly
rejecting the district court’s first reason for rejecting the plaintiff’s claim,
but adopted the second justification. The court of appeals indicated that the
plaintiff was not required to provide statistical evidence to make out a
prima facie case if she could establish that all or substantially all pregnant
170. Id. at 819.
171. Id.; see also Maganuco v. Leyden Community High School District, 939 F.2d

440, 445 (7th Cir. 1991) (“This is not to say that a policy which does not provide
adequate leave to accommodate the period of disability associated with pregnancy
might not be vulnerable under a disparate impact theory of liability under Title VII.
Indeed, courts have struck down such policies.”).
172. Abraham, 660 F.2d at 819-20.
173. 107 F. Supp. 2d 744 (N.D. Miss. 2000).
174. Id. at 746-47.
175. Id. at 747.
176. Stout v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 282 F.3d 856, 858 (5th Cir. 2002).
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women would be adversely affected by the challenged policy. The court
noted that the plaintiff presented expert testimony that no pregnant woman
who gives birth would be able to work for at least two weeks, and the court
agreed that this evidence would be sufficient under the “all or substantially
all” standard.177 The court indicated that this evidence might well be
enough to establish a prima facie case of disparate impact if it agreed with
the plaintiff’s legal interpretation of the statute.178 But the court rejected
that argument on the ground that the plaintiff could not use that type of
evidence to challenge an employer’s limit on absenteeism. The court
reasoned:
It is the nature of pregnancy and childbirth that at some point, for a
limited period of time, a woman who gives birth will be unable to work.
All job requirements, regardless of their nature, affect “all or
substantially all pregnant women.” If [the plaintiff’s argument] is taken
to its logical extreme, then every pregnant woman can make out a prima
facie case against her employer for pregnancy discrimination, unless the
employer grants special leave to all pregnant employees. This is not the
law—the PDA does not require preferential treatment of pregnant
employees and does not require employers to treat pregnancy related
179
absences more leniently than other absences.

Accordingly, the court of appeals indicated that it would not allow the
plaintiff’s evidence to be sufficient to show disparate impact when her only
challenge was “that the amount of time of sick leave granted to employees
is insufficient to accommodate the time off required in a typical
pregnancy,” because that conclusion would be contrary to the language of
the statute, which requires only equal treatment. The court indicated that
such a construction of the statute would turn it into a “guarantee of medical
leave for pregnant employees.”180
Even if the court’s decision can be read as rejecting only the evidence of
impact presented by the plaintiff—in that perhaps such a strict limitation on
leave would adversely affect not only pregnant women but a whole range
of other employees—, the court’s second justification for rejecting the
plaintiff’s claim is clearly incorrect. The court’s insistence that the
Pregnancy Discrimination Act mandates precisely equal treatment of
pregnant women and other employees and therefore cannot be used to
challenge such “equal treatment” reflects a profound ignorance of the point
177.
178.
179.
180.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 861.
Id. at 861-62.
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of the disparate impact theory, which makes unlawful even “equal”
treatment of protected classes in some instances. The court’s reference to
the fact that pregnant women are not entitled to “preferential treatment”
also reflects a serious lack of understanding of the disparate impact theory.
Pregnant women who seek to challenge the application of a neutral policy
to them as a violation of the disparate impact theory are not seeking
“preferential treatment,” but instead are challenging the lawfulness of the
employer’s policy itself. The black plaintiffs in Griggs who challenged the
act of the employer in imposing a high school diploma and “intelligence”
test requirements on them were not seeking “preferential treatment,” but
equal employment opportunities.
Pregnant women who challenge
restrictive leave policies under the disparate impact theory are also seeking
the equal opportunity to maintain their employment even though pregnant,
not preferential treatment. And if they are successful in their disparate
impact challenge, the employer is not required to treat them
“preferentially” by providing them leave when other similarly situated
employees are not. The remedy for violation of the disparate impact theory
is invalidation of the employer’s unlawful policy.
Perhaps, instead, what the Stout court meant is that disparate impact
claims are not cognizable under the Pregnancy Discrimination Act at all,
because of its language about same treatment, but the court did not say that.
In any event, such a conclusion would be at odds with the controlling
precedent that such claims are cognizable.181 Or perhaps instead the court
was saying that absenteeism policies are not subject to challenge under the
disparate impact theory, at least when pregnancy is the ground on which
the challenge is made. Not only is such a limitation not supported by the
language of Title VII, which extends the scope of the disparate impact
theory to employment practices generally, but it would be odd not to allow
a disparate impact challenge to an employer’s policy precisely because
such a policy has a profound disparate impact on the group seeking the
statute’s protection from the policy at issue. That is, this type of reasoning
would suggest that pregnant women are not protected from policies that
seek to severely limit available leave precisely because of the severe
disparate impact that those policies have on them.
The Stout court’s reasoning is defective for another reason. While the
court may be correct that the recognition of disparate impact claims based
on restrictive leave policies may allow pregnant women to make out prima
facie cases of disparate impact, this certainly does not mean that all
employers will have to guarantee pregnant women medical leave in all
circumstances, regardless of the nature of the employer’s business or the

181. See text accompanying supra notes 112 – 137.
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burden that such a requirement would impose on employers. The Stout
court was addressing only whether a plaintiff could make out a prima facie
case of discrimination; an employer can rebut such a prima facie case by
proving that its requirement is job-related and supported by business
necessity.
Accordingly, an employer with a sufficient job-related
justification for denying leave would not violate Title VII, although an
employer without such a justification would not be able to enforce its
restrictive leave policy.
Other courts seem to have concluded that policies based on absenteeism
are not cognizable under the disparate impact theory, at least when those
claims assert the disproportionate effects of such policies on pregnant
women. In Dormeyer v. Comercia Bank-Illinois,182 the United States Court
of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit addressed the issue of whether a woman
discharged for absenteeism after she became pregnant, when she claimed
that almost half of her absences were attributable to severe morning
sickness, had made out a claim of disparate impact. Rather than
concluding that she had not shown that the employer’s absence policy
disparately impacted pregnant women, the court of appeals instead
suggested that an employer’s absenteeism policy was not subject to
challenge under the disparate impact theory at all, even “if it could be
shown that the policy weighed more heavily on pregnant employees than
nonpregnant ones.”183 The court indicated that the disparate impact theory
was developed for situations in which employers impose eligibility
requirements for a job that are “not really necessary,” and the court said
that the plaintiff’s claim did not involve such a situation: “[t]he argument
here is not that the employer has adopted rules or practices that arbitrarily
exclude pregnant women, but that the employer should be required to
excuse pregnant women from having to satisfy the legitimate requirements
of the job.”184
The error of the Dormeyer court’s analysis, however, is clear from the
most cursory review of its reasoning against the requirements of the
disparate impact theory. The court summarily rejected the plaintiff’s
disparate impact challenge to the employer’s absenteeism policy because of
its apparent presumption that the employer’s absenteeism policy was
legitimate, without even addressing whether the policy might have a
disparate impact on pregnant women. Instead, if a policy has a disparate
impact on women, an employer is required to prove that its policy is
legitimate, that is, related to the requirements of the job and supported by

182. 223 F.3d 579, 581 (7th Cir. 2000).
183. Id. at 583.
184. Id. at 583-84.
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business necessity. But the court imposed no such burden on the employer,
instead apparently assuming that all attendance policies are legitimate.
While many attendance policies will presumably meet the job-related and
business necessity standards, some—such as unduly restrictive leave
policies that cannot be justified by a job or the employer’s situation—may
not. And such a policy that could not be justified by those standards would
be exactly the type of policy that “arbitrarily exclude[s] pregnant women,”
precisely the type of policy that the court indicated that disparate impact
theory was developed to address.185
The courts that have allowed restrictive leave policies to be challenged
as a violation of the disparate impact theory are better reasoned and are
more consistent with Supreme Court precedent than those that have not
185. There is another famous, or infamous, decision of the United States Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, also written by Judge Posner, which also suggests that
the disparate impact theory cannot be used to challenge lack of accommodations for
pregnant women because “properly understood, disparate impact as a theory of liability
is a means of dealing with the residues of past discrimination, rather than a warrant for
favoritism.” 20 F.3d at 738. That decision is Troupe v. May Dep’t Stores Co., 20 F.3d
734 (7th Cir. 1994), and it contains so many errors of analysis that it might be amusing
if it were not cited so often by other courts. First, Judge Posner reaches out to postulate
about the purpose of the disparate impact theory in a case in which he acknowledges
that the plaintiff only brought a claim of disparate treatment. Id. at 736. Second, his
suggestion that what he views as the purpose of the disparate impact theory guides how
the theory is to be applied and what types of employment practices can be challenged
under the theory has been expressly rejected by the Supreme Court. See Lewis v. City
of Chicago, 560 U.S. 205, 215 (2010) (noting that the Seventh Circuit had refused to
allow the plaintiff’s disparate impact claim to proceed because of its view that the
disparate impact theory was aimed only at intentional discrimination, the Court said:
“But even if the two theories were directed at the same evil, it would not follow that
their reach is therefore coextensive. If the effect of applying Title VII’s text is that
some claims that would be doomed under one theory will survive under the other, that
is the product of the law Congress has written. It is not for us to rewrite the statute so
that it covers only what we think is necessary to achieve what we think Congress really
intended.”). Third, the court fails to find even an inference of intent to discriminate in
the comment, steeped in stereotypical views about pregnant women, of the plaintiff’s
supervisor that the plaintiff was being fired because her supervisor did not think that
she intended to return to work after she had her baby. Troupe, 20 F.3d at 735-37.
Fourth, the court fails to draw all inferences in favor of the plaintiff as the non-moving
party on summary judgment, instead coming up with its own explanation for why the
plaintiff was terminated on the eve of her planned maternity leave. Troupe, 20 F.3d at
737-38. Finally, the oft-quoted statement in the opinion to the effect that “[e]mployers
can treat pregnant women as badly as they treat similarly situated but nonpregnant
employees” in connection with the discussion of the disparate impact theory
fundamentally misconceives the very foundations of that theory, which under some
circumstances finds a violation of Title VII in such claimed “equal” treatment. A
theory that allows a challenge to policies that have a disproportionate and unjustified
effect on pregnant women is not “a warrant for favoritism.”
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allowed such claims. And while some plaintiffs will fail to make out a
prima facie case of disparate impact because of failures of proof,186
restrictive leave policies that treat pregnant women identically to all other
employees may be shown to disproportionately affect women in general
and pregnant women in particular, precisely because women affected by
pregnancy are likely to need more leave than other employees. It is true, of
course, that non-pregnant employees may need leave for injuries and other
conditions, but because of the extended nature of pregnancy and childbirthrelated disabilities, pregnant women and those affected by childbirth are
more likely to run afoul of restrictive leave policies. So, for example, in
United States Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Warshawsky
& Co.,187 during a four year period, the employer discharged 53 employees
under its policy of requiring all employees to work one year before being
entitled to sick leave. Only three of those employees were male, while 50
were female and 20 were pregnant; during that same period, the employer
employed 1,105 female employees and 773 male employees.188
Accordingly, the district court noted that both pregnant women and women
in general were much more likely to be terminated under the employer’s
policy than were men.189
3.

Disparate Impact Challenges to Physical Job Requirements

Another type of employment policy that likely has a disproportionate
effect on pregnant women is a policy imposing lifting or other physical
requirements on employees, in that pregnant women may be temporarily
unable to fulfill those requirements, either because of a high-risk
pregnancy, which might require severe restrictions on physical activity by
186. See Crnokrak v. Evangelical Health Sys. Corp., 819 F. Supp. 737, 738-39, 745
(N.D. Ill. 1993) (employee who was replaced while on maternity leave, because her job
was given to another employee who threatened to leave if her job was not upgraded,
did not state a claim of disparate impact because she did not identify any specific
practice that affects women unfavorably and “there is no indication that typical
mothers-to-be were burdened significantly by the leave limitations that EHS
imposed”); Davidson v. Franciscan Health Sys. of the Ohio Valley, Inc., 82 F. Supp. 2d
768, 774-75 (S.D. Ohio 2000) (employee terminated for exceeding twenty-six weeks of
leave under employer’s policy did not make out claim of disparate impact based on
pregnancy because although 21 women and only one man was terminated under the
policy, only one of the 21 women terminated was on medical leave due to pregnancy).
187. 768 F. Supp. 647, 650 (N.D. Ill. 1991).
188. Id. at 654.
189. Id. at 654-55. The district court measured the impact of the employer’s policy
under the “eighty percent rule” found in the EEOC Uniform Guidelines on Employee
Selection Procedures, 29 C.F.R. § 1607.4D, which it described as follows: “the failure
of a sex, race or ethnic group to have a success rate which is at least 80% of the rate of
the most successful group is considered evidence of adverse impact.” Id. at 655.
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pregnant women,190 or because of physical limitations imposed by
pregnancy and childbirth more generally, which might impose restrictions
on pregnant women that they not engage in very heavy lifting or very
rigorous physical activity, at least at certain periods of their pregnancy or
during recovery from childbirth.191
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in Garcia v.
Woman’s Hospital of Texas192 considered a claim of disparate impact based
on pregnancy brought by a woman who was refused the right to return to
work after suffering pregnancy-related complications of chronic vomiting
and dehydration because her physician refused to certify that she could
“push, pull, lift, and support” over 150 pounds.193 The employer cited its
policy of disallowing employees on medical leave to return to work with
any work restrictions in refusing to allow her to return to work, and then
discharged her under another policy providing that employees on medical
leave for more than six months were to be discharged. Because the
plaintiff was early in her pregnancy when she initially took medical leave
and because she was not allowed to return to work, the combination of
these two policies resulted in her effective termination.194 The court of
appeals noted that if the plaintiff could establish that the lifting restriction
“would cause pregnant women as a group to be forced onto unnecessary
190. For example, the plaintiff in Young v. United Parcel Service Inc., 575 U.S. __,
135 S. Ct. 1338 (2015), who was pregnant through in vitro fertilization and who had
suffered a previous miscarriage, was told by her doctor that she should not lift more
than 20 pounds during the first 20 weeks of her pregnancy or more than 10 pounds
thereafter.
191. For example, the plaintiff in the case of Garcia v. Woman’s Hosp. of Tex., 97
F.3d 810, 811-12 (5th Cir. 1996), was refused permission to return to work after
suffering from dehydration and chronic vomiting caused by her pregnancy because her
physician refused to certify that she was able to “push, pull, lift, and support over 150
pounds.” For a discussion of the lifting restrictions that may be recommended for
pregnant women, as well as other physical requirements that may be difficult for
women to perform at some stages of their pregnancy, see Deborah A. Calloway,
Accommodating Pregnancy in the Workplace, 25 STETSON L. REV. 1, 3-7 (1995); see
also Joanna Grossman, Pregnancy, Work, and the Promise of Equal Citizenship, 98
GEO. L. J. 567, 578-84 (2010) (discussing potential conflicts between pregnancy and
the physical demands of certain jobs, including the fact that the Council on Scientific
Affairs has issued guidelines suggesting that repetitive lifting of more than 50 pounds
should generally be stopped after the twentieth week of pregnancy). The large number
of litigated cases involving pregnant women terminated or forced to take leaves of
absence because of lifting restrictions imposed by their physicians provides anecdotal
evidence of the pervasiveness of such restrictions imposed by the physicians of
pregnant women.
192. 97 F.3d 810 (5th Cir. 1996).
193. Id. at 811-12.
194. Id.
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medical leave” and then be terminated, she could establish a prima facie
case of disparate impact.195 The court noted that this showing might be
established by statistical evidence of the effect of the policy on pregnant
women or, even without statistical evidence, by a showing that “all or
substantially all pregnant women would be advised by their obstetrician not
to lift 150 pounds.”196 The court of appeals ultimately upheld the rejection
of the plaintiff’s disparate impact claims, however, because the testimony
presented by her physician was not that no pregnant woman could lift 150
pounds, but that “she could not accept the potential legal liability
associated with saying that any woman could lift 150 pounds, whether
pregnant or not.”197 The court indicated that this testimony was “not an
expert opinion about the likely effect of the 150-pound-restriction on all
pregnant workers” and therefore was insufficient to establish a prima facie
case of disparate impact.198
The United States District Court for the District of Kansas also held that
a plaintiff had not established a prima facie case of disparate impact with
respect to the employer’s policy that she be able to lift more than 40
pounds in Porter v. Kansas.199 The plaintiff was a psychiatric aid at a state
hospital when she became pregnant. Her initial treating physician indicated
that she should not lift more than 40 pounds. Her employer indicated that
because of that restriction, she had three options: to request another
statement from her doctor, to request a leave of absence, or to sign a
statement agreeing to work with a risk of injury; she was told that she could
not work with the restriction in place and was sent home. Although she did
receive a statement from another doctor indicating that she could do lifting
up to 120 pounds, she apparently did not provide that statement to the
employer. She was ultimately discharged for failure to return to work.200
The district court concluded that the plaintiff had not made out a prima
facie of disparate impact because she had not shown that the employer’s
policy had “the effect of discriminating against women, or even pregnant
women, as a class” because another pregnant woman had no such doctor’s
restriction on heavy lifting during her pregnancy and because the plaintiff
was successful in having a new treating physician remove her lifting
restriction.201 While it may be true that the plaintiff did not present

195.
196.
197.
198.
199.
200.
201.

Id. at 813.
Id.
Id.
Garcia v. Woman’s Hosp. of Tex., 143 F.3d 227, 231-32 (5th Cir. 1998).
757 F. Supp. 1224, 1230 (D. Kan. 1991).
Id. at 1227-28.
Id. at 1230.
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sufficient evidence of the disproportionate effect on pregnant women of a
restriction against heavy lifting—the court gives no indication of the
evidence, if any, provided by the plaintiff in support of her claim—the
evidence cited by the court with respect to another pregnant woman with
no such restriction obviously does not mean that the employer’s policy had
no such disparate effect. After all, the Supreme Court in Griggs did not
conclude that the Duke Power Company’s high school diploma
requirement had no disparate impact simply because one of its black
employees did have a high school diploma.202
The result in the Garcia case does not suggest that lifting requirements
and other demanding physical job requirements do not have a disparate
impact on pregnant women, only that the plaintiff in that case suffered a
failure in proving the disparate impact of the policy in question. And the
justification cited by the Porter court for the failure of the plaintiff to make
out a prima facie case of disparate impact is patently incorrect, even though
it may have been true that the plaintiff in that case did not produce
appropriate evidence to establish the disproportionate impact that the
employer’s requirement likely had on pregnant women.
4.

Disparate Impact Challenges to Restrictive Accommodation Policies

Related to, and often operating in concert with, lifting and other
demanding physical job requirements are employer policies of providing
accommodations to those requirements, often known as “light duty” or
“modified duty” positions, for only certain categories of employees, such
as employees who have suffered on-the-job injuries or employees who
meet other specified conditions, such as qualifying as “disabled” under the
law.203 Even though women affected by pregnancy may be similarly
situated to those other employees with respect to their ability to work and
therefore could likely perform the modified duties of those positions if
given the opportunity, those women are denied the ability to do – and often
must take leave or be terminated as a result – merely because the source of
their inability to meet those physical requirements differs from those other
employees. This favored treatment of employees who meet the employer’s

202. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 427 n.2 (1971).
203. The employer in the case of Young v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 575 U.S. __,

135 S. Ct. 1338 (2015), had such a policy, allowing several categories of employees to
be relieved of some of the tasks of their positions or be placed on light or modified
duty; that employer provided some sort of job accommodation to employees injured on
the job, employees who had lost their Department of Transportation certification, and
employees qualified as “disabled” under the Americans With Disabilities Act, but
purportedly refused to provide accommodation to employees who did not fit within one
of these categories, including pregnant women.
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specified conditions may well have a disparate impact on pregnant women;
pregnant women, after all, have not suffered an on-the-job injury and
generally have not been considered to meet the requirements of “disability”
under the Americans With Disabilities Act.204
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York in
Germain v. County of Suffolk205 refused to grant summary judgment for the
employer on a police officer’s Title VII claim that the denial of light-duty
assignments to pregnant women because of the employer’s policy that such
assignments were limited to persons suffering occupational injuries had a
disparate impact on pregnant women.206 In a prior case brought against the
same defendant, a jury had concluded that an identical policy by another
agency of the defendant county had a disparate impact on pregnant women;
that case was ultimately settled by a consent decree, which required, among
other things, for the employer to alter its policy.207 In the Germain case,
the plaintiff sought a light-duty assignment after disclosing her pregnancy,
supported by a note from her physician indicating that she would be unable

204. Because pregnancy is a natural condition and not an impairment as such,
neither pregnancy nor complications arising from pregnancy have traditionally been
considered to qualify as a “disability” and therefore protection has generally not been
extended under the Americans With Disabilities Act for pregnancy-related disabilities
suffered by pregnant women, even when those conditions are substantially disabling.
See Gorman v. Wells Mfg. Corp., 209 F. Supp. 2d 970, 974-76 (S.D. Iowa 2002)
(collecting cases and stating that “the majority of federal courts hold that pregnancyrelated complications do not constitute a disability under the ADA”). As the Supreme
Court recognized in Young, the EEOC, as well as others, have taken the position that
changes to the ADA made by the ADA Amendments Act of 2008 may require that
employers offer accommodations to women disabled by pregnancy. Young, 135 S. Ct.
at 1348.
See also U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, NO. 915.003,
ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE: PREGNANCY DISCRIMINATION AND RELATED ISSUES (July
14, 2014) (indicating that some pregnancy-related complications may be “disabilities”
under the ADA, imposing a duty of reasonable accommodation on employers).
Whether and the extent to which a duty to accommodate pregnancy exists under the
Americans With Disabilities Act is beyond the scope of this article.
205. No. 07-CV-2523, 2009 WL 1514513 (E.D.N.Y. May 29, 2009), later
proceeding, 672 F. Supp. 2d 319 (E.D.N.Y. 2009). The same district court in
Lehmuller v. Inc. Vill., 944 F. Supp. 1087, 1092 (E.D.N.Y. 1996), also held that a
pregnant police officer denied light duty because of the employer’s policy of providing
light duty only to officers injured on the job “has shown that the Village adopted a
light-duty policy that has an adverse impact on pregnant officers and, therefore, has
established a prima facie case of disparate impact discrimination,” but the case contains
no discussion of the showing made by the plaintiff.
206. Germain, 2009 WL 1514513, at *3-4.
207. Id. at *1; see also Lochren v. Cty. of Suffolk, No. CV 01-3925, 2008 WL
2039458, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. May 9, 2008) (in context of award of attorneys’ fees, court
described underlying claim and jury verdict).
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to perform a full-duty assignment. After the denial of her request, she was
required to take unpaid leave, resulting in a loss of health care benefits and
denial of seniority.208 The employer argued that this policy did not
disproportionately affect pregnant women because it was applied
consistently to deny light-duty assignments to all non-occupational injuries,
but the court rejected that contention.209 Instead of measuring the impact of
the policy on pregnant women by comparing the effect of that policy on
other persons with non-occupational injuries who sought light-duty, the
court said that the proper measurement was the comparative impact of that
policy on non-pregnant persons.210 The court went on to conclude that the
plaintiff had proven a prima facie case of disparate impact because
pregnant officers unable to perform full-duty would never be eligible for
light duty under the employer’s policy, while at least some non-pregnant
employees would, those with occupational injuries.211 The district court’s
decision does not to indicate whether the plaintiff in that case presented any
statistical evidence in support of her claim of disparate impact or whether
the court presumed disparate impact because “the distinction the Park
Department’s policy draws between occupational and non-occupational
injuries necessarily excludes pregnant women from light-duty.”212 Because
the parties had not developed the issue of whether the employer could
demonstrate the business necessity of the practice, the court denied the
employer’s motion for summary judgment.213 At trial, the jury found that
the employer’s policy of restricting light-duty assignments to persons with
occupational injuries was unlawful because it had a disparate impact on
pregnant women.214
In contrast to the Germain court’s willingness to accept the plaintiff’s
evidence of disparate impact based on the relative effect on pregnant
persons and non-pregnant persons in general of the employer’s restriction
of light duty to those with occupational injuries, the district court in
Woodward v. Rest Haven Christian Services215 held that the plaintiff in that
case had not provided sufficient evidence of the disparate impact of the
employer’s policy restricting light-duty assignments to those who had
208. Germain, 2009 WL 1514513, at *1-2.
209. Id. at *3.
210. Id. at *3-4 (“In the present context, the PDA only requires the Plaintiff to show

that nonpregnant Park Department officers similarly unable to perform full-duty
assignments were treated more favorably than her.”).
211. Id. at *4.
212. Id. at *3.
213. Id. at *4.
214. Germain v. Cty. of Suffolk, 672 F. Supp. 2d 319, 321 (E.D.N.Y. 2009).
215. No. 07 C 0665, 2009 WL 703270 (N.D. Ill. March 16, 2009).
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suffered an on-the-job injury.216 The plaintiff, a nursing assistant at a
nursing home, sought light duty pursuant to the direction of her physician
during her pregnancy. That request was denied, resulting in her being
taken off the work schedule for the duration of her pregnancy. The district
court rejected her disparate impact claim, rejecting as insufficient her
assertion that the policy had to have a disparate impact on pregnant women
because 100 percent of pregnant employees were excluded by the policy,
while some non-pregnant employees were provided light duty.217 The court
said that this evidence was insufficient because the plaintiff had not
established that every pregnant employee would need light-duty during her
pregnancy and the court indicated that it was “not at liberty to assume this
fact.”218
The reasoning of the Woodward court might be challenged as
inconsistent with the instruction of the Supreme Court in Dothard v.
Rawlinson that plaintiffs are not “required to exhaust every possible source
of evidence, if the evidence actually presented on its face conspicuously
demonstrates a job requirement’s grossly discriminatory impact.”219 That
is, one might imagine that in a position with rigorous lifting and other
physical requirements, such as nursing positions in nursing homes in which
patients need to be lifted and otherwise assisted with daily tasks, most, if
not all, pregnant women might require accommodation and seek light-duty
assignments if those assignments were known to be available to them.
Similar to the situation in Dothard in which the Court indicated that
requiring information on the height and weight of actual applicants might
distort the actual disparate impact of the challenged height and weight
restrictions in that case because “of a self-recognized inability to meet the
very standards challenged as being discriminatory,”220 measuring which
pregnant women “needed” light-duty assignments by determining who
asked for such accommodation or who presented medical certification for
such assignments risks distorting the actual disparate impact of such
practices. Women who have a physical need for such accommodation
might fail to seek accommodation because they know that they do not
satisfy the requirements of the employer’s policy and might fear the
economic consequences of providing medical documentation that could
result in forced leave or even termination.
In Spivey v. Beverly Enterprises, Inc.,221 the United States Court of
216.
217.
218.
219.
220.
221.

Id. at *5.
Id. at *1, 6.
Id. at *6.
433 U.S. 321, 331 (1977).
Id. at 330.
196 F.3d 1309 (11th Cir. 1999).
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Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit rejected as unsubstantiated the disparate
impact claim of a pregnant employee who was terminated because the
employer refused to provide an accommodation to a lifting restriction
imposed by her physician under its modified duty policy, which it made
available only to employees who suffered from work-related injuries.
Although the court of appeals seemed to suggest that a claim of disparate
impact could be made out with respect to the employer’s modified duty
policy, if it could be shown to have a disproportionate impact on pregnant
employees, the court held that the plaintiff had failed to prove that the
employer’s policy had a disparate impact in practice.222 The plaintiff in the
Spivey case suffered a failure of proof, in that instance by not presenting
any statistical or other evidence in support of her claim of disparate
impact.223 The result in this case certainly does not suggest that plaintiffs
will not be able to establish, with the proper proof, that policies of
restricting light or modified duty assignments to individual with on-the-job
or occupational injuries have a disparate impact on women affected by
pregnancy and childbirth.
The outcome in the existing cases addressing disparate impact claims
based on an employer’s restrictive leave policies, lifting or other physical
requirements, and policies restricting accommodations, such as light or
modified duties, to employees with on-the-job injuries or other categories
of employees suggests a reason to be cautious about the potential for
women affected by pregnancy and childbirth to be successful in
establishing claims of disparate impact on the basis of pregnancy.
However, a correct application of the rules of disparate impact developed
by the Supreme Court suggests that women affected by pregnancy should,
in the proper case, be able to establish a prima facie case of disparate
impact on the basis of pregnancy based on the type of employer policies
discussed above.224 To the extent that the claims in existing cases have

222. Id. at 1314.
223. Id.
224. See, for example, Grossman & Thomas, supra note 10, at 43. In that article,

the authors provide information about the evidence presented in support of the
plaintiffs’ disparate impact claims in Lochren v. Cty. of Suffolk, No. CV 01-3925, 2008
WL 2039458, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. May 9, 2008), in which the plaintiffs successfully
demonstrated that the employer’s policy of restricting light duty to employees injured
on the job violated the disparate impact theory. The plaintiffs in that case had
presented evidence that before the employer implemented its restriction on light duty
assignments, pregnant women had “used light duty in statistically significant higher
proportions, compared to their total numbers on the force, than the overall force used
sick light duty: approximately 6.1 percent of the women on the nearly-2000 officer
force used light duty for pregnancy each year, by comparison, slightly over 1.2 percent
of the total number of officers used light duty for other off-the-job illnesses and
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been unsuccessful, at least some of that failure appears to be attributable to
failures of proof, perhaps because those cases were litigated without
sufficient knowledge about the requirements of disparate impact claims or
without the resources to produce the type of statistical and other evidence
necessary to sustain a prima facie case of disparate impact. It may not be a
coincidence that at least one of the successful claims of disparate impact
based on pregnancy to date was litigated by the EEOC.
B. The Job-Relatedness and Business Necessity of Employer Failures to
Extend Accommodations to Pregnant Women
If women affected by pregnancy are successful in establishing that
restrictive leave policies and other employer policies that effectively deny
accommodation to the physical limitations imposed by pregnancy have a
disproportionate negative effect on pregnant women or even women in
general, employers maintaining those policies will be required to come
forward with justifications for those policies. As is true with its general
lack of guidance on how employees might be able to make out prima facie
cases of disparate impact based on pregnancy, the EEOC guidance provides
little help to employers on how such justification may be established.
Rather, the EEOC guidance generally recounts the statutory requirement
that Title VII is violated if “the employer cannot show that the policy is job
related for the position in question and consistent with business
necessity.”225 Although the guidance gives no indication of what the
requirement of job relatedness might mean in the context of an employer
policy with a disproportionate effect on pregnant women, the guidance
does indicate that the business necessity defense can be met with a showing
“that the requirement is ‘necessary to safe and efficient job
performance.’”226
Congress in the Civil Rights Act of 1991, which expressly codified the
disparate impact theory in Title VII, did not define the terms “job related”
or “business necessity,” other than to make clear that its purpose was “to
codify the concepts of ‘business necessity’ and ‘job related’ enunciated by
the Supreme Court in Griggs v. Duke Power Co. and in the other Supreme
Court decisions prior to Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio.”227 A review
of those cases demonstrates that those concepts will impose a rigorous
burden on employers to justify their practices that disproportionately
conditions each year.”
225. U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, NO. 915.003, ENFORCEMENT
GUIDANCE ON PREGNANCY DISCRIMINATION AND RELATED ISSUES (June 25, 2015).
226. Id.
227. Civil Rights Act of 1991, PUB. L. NO. 102-166, § 3, 105 Stat. 1071 (1991)
(citations omitted).
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disadvantage women affected by pregnancy by failing to accommodate the
temporary physical limitations associated with pregnancy and childbirth.
From the Griggs case comes both a definition of “business necessity”
and “job related” and an indication that those standards will be enforced
with some rigor. In the context of a challenge to a high school diploma and
“intelligence test” requirements, the Court declared that an employment
practice with a discriminatory impact must be “shown to be related to job
performance,” shown “to bear a demonstrable relationship to successful
performance of the job[],” or shown to have “a manifest relationship to the
employment in question.”228 The Court rejected the employer’s general
claims that these requirements were necessary to improve the quality of the
workforce as insufficient and unsubstantiated.229 The Court in Albemarle
added that the defense of job relatedness “cannot be proved through vague
and unsubstantiated hearsay.”230 And the Court in Dothard rejected as
insufficient to prove job relatedness what might have been thought to be a
common-sense notion that the challenged height and weight restrictions in
that case “have a relationship to strength, a sufficient but unspecified
amount of which is essential to effective job performance as a correctional
counselor.” Instead, the Court demanded proof of the correlation between
the challenged employment practice and the job requirement asserted.231
It is true that the Court in Wards Cove sought to soften the burden on
employers with respect to the required showings of business necessity and
job relatedness, not only by relieving the employer of the burden of
persuasion with respect to those defenses,232 but also by redefining the
terms to mean that “a challenged practice serves, in a significant way, the
legitimate employment goals of the employer,” with this inquiry requiring
more than a “mere insubstantial justification” for use of the practice.233
The Court also noted, quite counter-intuitively, that the requirement of
business necessity did not impose any requirement that the practice “be
‘essential’ or ‘indispensable’ to the employer’s business.”234 Of course, not
only did the dissenting justices call out the majority’s attempt to
misconstrue and alter the Court’s prior precedent on disparate impact,235
but Congress also soundly rejected those efforts. Whatever the terms “job
228.
229.
230.
231.
232.
233.
234.
235.

Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431-32 (1971).
Id. at 431.
Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 428 n.23 (1975).
Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 331 (1977).
Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 659-60 (1989).
Id. at 659.
Id.
See id. at 661-62 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); id. at 662-79 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
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related” and “business necessity” are intended by Congress to mean, those
terms assuredly do not mean what the majority of the Court in Wards Cove
said they meant.
Because very few lower courts have found the plaintiffs to have
established a prima facie case of disparate impact based on pregnancy, the
lower courts have had relatively few opportunities to determine what type
of showing might meet the requirements of those defenses in the context of
employer’s policies that fail to accommodate to the temporary physical
limitations associated with pregnancy and childbirth. However, the few
instances in which the courts have addressed whether an employer has
provided sufficient justification for its practices that disadvantage pregnant
women suggest that employers might have difficulty meeting the
requirements of job relatedness and business necessity with respect to those
practices.
In the case of United States Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
v. Warshawsky & Co.,236 the district court rejected the employer’s asserted
business justification for its practice of not allowing any leave for illness or
disability during the first year of employment, which the court found to
have a disparate impact on women because of pregnancy based on the
statistical evidence provided by the plaintiff.237 The employer claimed that
its policy was necessary to reward employees for staying with the company
for more than one year and to reduce the effects of turnover on the
company. The court held that this was an insufficient showing to justify
the policy.238 Interestingly, this case was decided under the standards set
forth in Wards Cove, which have since been abandoned. If that showing
was insufficient even under the softened standards for business necessity
and job relatedness from that case, that showing would clearly be
insufficient under the more rigorous standards reinstated by the Civil
Rights Act of 1991.
There is reason to believe that employers will have difficulty justifying
their restrictive leave policies as supported by business necessity and job
relatedness. A policy of refusing leave to pregnant employees needed to
allow them to deal with the physical limitations imposed by pregnancy and
childbirth would not seem to be related to the successful performance of
any particular job, at least a job that does not depend on the employees
always being present, if such jobs exist. The question is not whether
employees need to be present at work in order to do their jobs; for most
jobs, they do. The question is whether a requirement of no or very limited

236. 768 F. Supp. 647 (N.D. Ill. 1991).
237. Id. at 658.
238. Id.
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absences, either at any time or during a probationary period, can be said to
be necessary for successful performance of the job or necessary to the
employer’s business, rather than just convenient for the employer. The fact
that federal law, by way of the Family and Medical Leave Act, mandates
that employers provide leave for a number of purposes, including self-care
and family care, to pregnant women and other employers, suggests that the
standard of job-relatedness and business necessity for a restrictive leave
policy cannot be met in most instances.239 After all, if employers are
legally required to provide leave for some pregnant women and other
employees, it will be harder for those employers to argue that providing
leave for pregnant women when not mandated by law to do so is
inconsistent with business necessity.
Employers may well be able to justify the job relatedness and business
necessity of practices and policies that require heavy lifting or impose other
physical requirements that disproportionately impact on a temporary basis
women affected by pregnancy and childbirth, at least with respect to some
jobs with rigorous physical requirements, which likely can be shown to
require performance of those functions.240 But, what employers likely will
not be able to show to be job related and consistent with business necessity
are practices of allowing some employees, but not pregnant women, to be
exempted from those functions, such as by the selective application of light
or modified duty rules. Employers are likely to seek to justify policies of
offering light duty only to employees injured on the job as related to
239. Contrary to the assertion of the district court in Stout v. Baxter Healthcare
Corp., 107 F. Supp. 2d 744, 747 (N.D. Miss. 2000), the existence of limitations on the
right to unpaid leave provided in the Family and Medical Leave Act to employees who
have been employed for at least one year and who worked at least 1,250 hours in that
year does not demonstrate the reasonableness, much less the business necessity or job
relatedness, of restrictive leave policies. Instead, those limitations are the result of
political compromise, rather than an indication that such limitations were necessary or
essential to the business interests of employers. See Deborah A. Widiss, Gilbert
Redux, The Interaction of the Pregnancy Discrimination Act and the Amended
Americans with Disabilities Act, 46 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 961, 1001-02 (2013)
(discussing the political compromises that led to the current limitations on unpaid leave
under the Family and Medical Leave Act).
240. On the other hand, some employers likely will not be able to show the job
relatedness or business necessity of their lifting or other physical requirements. For
example, the employer in Garcia v. Women’s Hosp. of Tex., 97 F.3d 810, 811-12 (5th
Cir. 1996), refused to allow the pregnant plaintiff to return to work after leave for
dehydration and chronic vomiting related to her pregnancy because her physician
refused to certify that she could “push, pull, lift, and support over 150 lbs.,” but the
hospital admitted that it did not test the plaintiff or any other applicant before hiring to
determine if they could lift that amount and did not test current employees. Based on
such evidence, the employer likely would not be able to prove that such a lifting
requirement was related to the jobs for which it was hiring or necessary to its business.
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seeking to reduce their worker’s compensation costs by obtaining work
from employees that they are required to compensate by law. However,
those considerations are not related to the ability of any employee to
perform the functions of the job, which is what the courts have said is
meant by being “job related.”241 Nor would such a reason meet the
standards of business necessity—such a reason might reflect convenience
or economic efficiency to the employer, but it would not seem to meet the
requirement that it be necessary or essential to the employer’s business,
unless, perhaps, the employer could demonstrate that the only way to
preserve light duty jobs for employees injured on the job was to exclude
others from those jobs. And, in any event, employers would have to prove
that this was true, not merely assert it as a justification for its policy of
favoring employees injured on the job.242
Similarly, the fact that employers are required to provide reasonable
accommodation to employees who meet the requirement of disability under
the Americans With Disabilities Act and therefore may, at least in some
circumstances, be required to extend light or modified duty to those
employees suggests that employers may have more difficulty establishing
that their failure to extend those accommodations to women affected by
pregnancy is job related and consistent with business necessity. That
employers are mandated by law to accommodate some employees says
nothing about the business necessity or, for that matter, the job relatedness
of failing to provide accommodation to others.243 The lack of a legal
241. See, for example, the claims of the employer in Lehmuller v. Inc. Vill. of Sag
Harbor, 944 F. Supp. 1087, 1092-93 (E.D.N.Y. 1996), which argued that it offered
light duty to employees injured on the job because it was required by law to pay them
whether they worked or not. Because the court found that the policy was not
consistently applied, it did not have to determine whether such a justification was
consistent with business necessity.
242. The court of appeals in Spivey v. Beverly Enter., Inc., 196 F.3d 1309, 1311 n.1
(11th Cir. 1999), explained the employer’s policy of restricting modified duty to only
employees injured on the job in the following way: “Appellee reserves modified duty
for employees with occupational injuries because there are only a limited number of
light duty tasks available at any one time. If light duty were made available to all
employees without regard to whether the injury was work-related, the light duty
‘positions’ would be depleted and unavailable when needed by employees with
worker’s compensation restrictions.” Because the court cites no support for this
conclusion, it is not clear whether this explanation was given by the employer or
divined by the court. In any event, there does not appear to have been any evidence
produced to support this statement, at least the court refers to none.
243. Nor does the fact that the Pregnancy Discrimination Act contains no explicit
requirement of reasonable accommodation, as does the Americans With Disabilities
Act, mean that the Pregnancy Discrimination Act must not be interpreted to mandate
accommodation of pregnant women when employer policies that fail to do so cause a
disparate impact, on the ground that otherwise the express accommodation requirement
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requirement of accommodation does not suggest that failure to
accommodate is necessary to the employer’s business. In fact, that
employers are able to accommodate some employees without undue
hardship244 to the employer’s business suggests that it may also be able to
accommodate pregnant women consistent with the needs of their business.
And, of course, if employers accommodate disabled employees even
though the employer could meet the standard of undue hardship, then their
accommodation of those employees is voluntary and not mandated by law.
Although involving a claim of disparate treatment rather than disparate
impact, the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Young v. United Parcel
Service, Inc. is instructive on what type of showing would likely be
insufficient to establish the job relatedness and business necessity of a
practice restricting light or modified duty assignments to employees injured
on the job, thereby excluding pregnant women from such assignments. The
Court indicated that a pregnant woman denied an accommodation provided
to other employees can make out a prima facie case of disparate treatment
by following the McDonnell Douglas proof scheme, creating an inference
of intentional discrimination by showing that she sought an accommodation
and that the employer did not accommodate her while accommodating
others similarly situated with respect to their ability to work.245 Next, the
employer must justify its refusal to accommodate the plaintiff by
articulating a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason to rebut the inference
of intentional discrimination. And, the Court said, when the employer
makes such a showing, “that reason normally cannot consist simply of a
claim that it is more expensive or less convenient to add pregnant women
to the category of those . . . whom the employer accommodates.”246 As the
Court makes clear by turning next to the issue of “pretext,”247 the
of the ADA would be irrelevant or meaningless. Such an argument would be incorrect.
While pregnant women are entitled to accommodation only when failure to do so
violates either the disparate treatment theory, because the employer intentionally
disfavors pregnant women, or the disparate impact theory, because the employer’s
policies disproportionately disadvantage pregnant women, the disabled are entitled to
reasonable accommodation as defined in the ADA regardless of the employer’s lack of
discriminatory intent to disfavor the disabled or whether the disabled suffer a disparate
impact because of the employer’s policies.
244. The Americans With Disabilities Act does not require an employer to provide
reasonable accommodation to a disabled employee if doing so would construe an
“undue hardship on the operation of the business” of the employer. 42 U.S.C. §
12112(b)(5)(A). “Undue hardship” means “an action requiring significant difficulty or
expense.” 42 U.S.C. § 12111(10).
245. Young v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 575 U.S. __, 135 S. Ct. 1338 (2015).
246. Id. at 1354.
247. Id.
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articulation of that sort of justification for the employer’s policy is not just
a matter of tending to show that the articulated reason is pretextual; instead,
such an articulated reason does not even meet the employer’s burden of
rebutting the plaintiff’s inference of discriminatory intent. The Court’s
reasoning is presumably either that such an articulated reason is not
“legitimate” or is not “non-discriminatory.”
If the employer’s assertions with respect to convenience and cost in
extending accommodations to pregnant women that they extend to others is
insufficient to rebut the inference of discriminatory intent created by the
McDonnell Douglas prima facie case, then those assertions clearly will be
insufficient, even if proven by evidence, to meet the standards of business
necessity and job relatedness required to refute a prima facie of disparate
impact. Even when the majority of the Supreme Court in Wards Cove
sought to blend the disparate treatment and disparate impact theories by
causing the job-related and business necessity defenses to claims of
disparate impact to resemble the defense of a “legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reason to claims of disparate treatment,” it was not
easier to establish a defense to a disparate impact claim than a disparate
treatment claim. And Congress rejected the Court’s efforts to make it
easier for employers to establish the job-related and business-necessity
defenses. Accordingly, the showing required by employers to defend
against the disparate impact of a challenged practice cannot be less than
that required by the Court in the Young case to rebut the claim that the
employer adopted its practice with an intent to discriminate.
C. Alternative Employment Practices to Failures to Accommodate on the
Basis of Pregnancy
Even if employers are able to demonstrate that their practices that
disproportionately impact women on the basis of pregnancy are job related
and consistent with business necessity, they will be able to lawfully use
those practices only if employees fail to establish the existence of
alternative practices that would meet the employer’s needs, but be less
discriminatory, and that the employer refuses to adopt those practices.248
248. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(ii); see also Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422
U.S. 405, 425 (1975) (“If an employer does then meet the burden of proving that its
tests are ‘job related,’ it remains open to the complaining party to show that other tests
or selection devices, without a similarly undesirable racial effect, would also serve the
employer’s legitimate interest in ‘efficient and trustworthy workmanship.’”). The
EEOC in its recent guidance indicates that if the employer succeeds in showing job
relatedness and business necessity, “a violation still can be found if there is a less
discriminatory alternative that meets the business need and the employer refuses to
adopt it.” U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, NO. 915.003, ENFORCEMENT
GUIDANCE ON PREGNANCY DISCRIMINATION AND RELATED ISSUES (June 25, 2015).
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Congress in the Civil Rights Act of 1991 failed to define precisely what is
meant by an “alternative employment practice,” except to apparently reject
the gloss on that issue provided by the Court in Wards Cove.249 The
Court’s cases prior to Wards Cove contain very little explanation of this
step in the disparate impact analysis. And the lower court cases dealing
with disparate impact claims on the basis of pregnancy generally do not
reach this step of the disparate impact analysis.250
What the Court in Wards Cove said about the third step in the disparate
impact analysis is that “any alternative practices which respondents offer
up in this respect must be equally effective as petitioners’ chosen hiring
procedures in achieving petitioners’ legitimate employment goals” and that
“[f]actors such as the cost or other burdens of proposed alternative
selection devices are relevant in determining whether they would be
equally as effective as the challenged practice in serving the employer’s
legitimate business goals.”251 But, of course, Congress did not adopt the
Wards Cove formulation of the “alternative employment practice” test, but
instead returned the test to what it had been before that decision. That the
plurality decision in Watson, decided the year before Wards Cove,
contained the same formulation as the Court’s decision in Wards Cove is
irrelevant because the plurality decision was not a decision of the Court and
therefore did not articulate “the law.” Accordingly, it would appear that
Congress has rejected the Wards Cove indication that the alternative
practice must be “equally effective,” particularly in terms of cost and
convenience to the employer, although Congress did adopt the holding in
Wards Cove that the employer must refuse to adopt that alternative
employment practice in order to be liable.
If an employer is able to establish that its restrictive leave policies and its

249. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(C) provides that the application of the “alternative
employment practice” step of the disparate impact analysis “shall be in accordance with
the law as it existed on June 4, 1989, with respect to the concept of ‘alternative
employment practice.’” The Wards Cove case was decided June 5, 1989.
250. In one of the few cases to even address the third step of the disparate impact
analysis in the context of a pregnancy discrimination claim, U.S. Equal Emp’t
Opportunity Comm’n v. Warshawsky, 768 F. Supp. 647, 655 (N.D. Ill. 1991), after
concluding that the employer had not met the burden of establishing business necessity,
the court suggested that alternatives existed in any event because the employer later
changed its policy “to a less discriminatory one” by reducing the amount of time
employees had to be employed before being eligible for sick leave. This case, decided
under the Wards Cove formulation of the second and third steps of disparate impact
analysis, which have been rejected by Congress, may suggest that it will be even more
difficult under present standards for employers to defend their restrictive leave policies.
251. Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 662 (1989) (quoting
Watson v. Fort Worth Bank and Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 998 (1988)).
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restrictions on light and modified duty are job related and consistent with
business necessity, in that the requirements of the particular job are
inconsistent with the absence of any employee of the length necessary for
women to deal with the physical effects of pregnancy and childbirth or that
providing accommodations to those women would effectively preclude the
employer from being able to provide accommodation to those it is legally
compelled to accommodate, it is likely that employees will be unable to
establish the existence of less discriminatory alternative employment
practices that will still meet the employer’s need. However, with respect to
lifting or other physical requirements, even if those requirements are found
to be job related and consistent with business necessity because related to
the requirements of particular jobs and necessary to the operations of the
employer, employees may well be able to establish the existence of less
discriminatory
alternative
employment
practices,
including
accommodations provided to women affected by pregnancy similar to those
provided to other employees, such as those injured on the job or those for
whom the law mandates accommodation. That those accommodations
might impose some economic cost or inconvenience on the employer
should not be dispositive with respect to whether those alternatives are
“equally effective” at meeting the business needs of the employer, because
Congress has rejected that limitation on the alternative employment
practice step sought to be imposed by the Court in Wards Cove.
VIII. CONCLUSION
This Article has demonstrated that while the disparate treatment theory
of discrimination may provide assistance to women affected by pregnancy
when they are denied work accommodations that employers provide to
other employees who are similarly situated with respect to their ability or
inability to work, the disparate impact theory may be of greater assistance
to women affected by pregnancy who seek accommodation even when the
employer does not provide accommodation to others. In addition, the
disparate impact theory does not require a showing that the employer
intended to discriminate against pregnant women in formulating its policies
or rejecting accommodations for pregnant women, while the disparate
treatment theory requires such a showing, even if that showing is inferred
from the effects of the employer’s policy. Accordingly, employers who are
found to have unintentionally, although unwisely, failed to extend
accommodations to pregnant women will presumably be found not to have
violated Title VII with respect to those actions under the disparate
treatment theory,252 while they may well be found liable under the disparate
252. The Supreme Court in Young v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., indicated that under
the disparate treatment theory, a plaintiff challenging an employer’s failure to
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impact theory.
This is not to say that disparate impact claims on the basis of pregnancy
are without their challenges. Because compensatory and punitive damages
are not available for disparate impact violations,253 women prevailing on
such claims will likely not be made whole for the injuries that they have
suffered from the employer’s unlawful action, even though they will force
employers to modify their policies to avoid disproportionately negative
effects on women affected by pregnancy. In addition, disparate impact
claims generally require evidence, particularly statistical evidence of the
disproportionate impact of employer practices, which is often difficult or
expensive to obtain.
These challenges associated with disparate impact claims based on
pregnancy suggest that the EEOC should play a greater role with respect to
issues surrounding claims of disparate impact on the basis of pregnancy.
Not only should the EEOC provide better guidance to both employees and
employers on the way in which the disparate impact theory might be
relevant to challenging employer practices with respect to pregnancy and
accommodation of employees, but the EEOC may be particularly well
suited to assist employees with bringing such claims because the EEOC
may have the resources and the motivation to pursue such claims that
individual private litigants and their potential attorneys may lack, because
of the greater difficulty and lesser economic rewards of pursuing disparate
impact claims. This commitment by the EEOC to assist with such claims
would appear to be fully consistent with the Commission’s most recent
Strategic Enforcement Plan, which identifies as a national priority the
involvement of the Commission in “addressing emerging and developing
issues,” including “accommodating pregnancy-related limitations under the
Americans with Disabilities Act Amendments Act (ADAAA) and the
Pregnancy Discrimination Act (PDA).”254 The involvement of the EEOC
in the litigation of such claims, again consistent with the terms of its

accommodate pregnant women while accommodating others “may reach a jury on this
issue by providing sufficient evidence that the employer’s policies impose a significant
burden on pregnant workers, and that the employer’s ‘legitimate, nondiscriminatory’
reasons are not sufficiently strong to justify the burden, but rather—when considered
along with the burden imposed—give rise to an inference of intentional
discrimination.” But reaching the jury does not guarantee that these employees will
prevail, because the jury could presumably still conclude that the employer, while not
having sufficient justification for its actions, did not intend to discriminate on the basis
of pregnancy.
253. 42 U.S.C. § 1981a.
254. U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, Strategic Enforcement Plan, FY
2013-2016, http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/plan/sep.cfm. pp. 1, 9-10.
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Strategic Enforcement Plan,255 could prove invaluable in establishing the
invalidity of employer practices that disproportionately impact women
affected by pregnancy and childbirth by failing to accommodate them. The
resulting restructuring of existing employer policies could fulfill the
promise of Title VII to eliminate employment practices that are “fair in
form, but discriminatory in operation” and that “operate as ‘built-in
headwinds’”256 for women who want nothing more than what men already
have, to be able “to have families without losing their jobs.”257

255. Id. at 7 (In section on “Litigation Program,” the plan states: “Meritorious cases
raising SEP or district priority issues should be given precedence in case selection.
Where appropriate, SEP priorities should also be considered in selecting cases for
amicus curiae participation.”).
256. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431-32 (1971).
257. Cal. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272, 289 (1987) (citing Gen.
Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 159 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting)). This is not to
say that men never face discrimination in connection with their decision to have
families. While men are not impacted by the physical aspects of pregnancy and
therefore their jobs generally are not threatened by the very fact of impending or actual
fatherhood, men who seek greater involvement in the raising of their children often
suffer job detriments, based on stereotypical notions about the “proper” role of men as
breadwinner rather than caretakers. See Unlawful Discrimination Against Pregnant
Workers and Works with Caregiving Responsibilities: Written Testimony of Joan C.
Williams, Professor of Law, University of California Hastings Foundation Chair and
Director, Center for Work Life Law; Testimony of Emily Martin, National Women’s
Law Center, (Feb. 15, 2012) (cataloging cases of caregiver bias against men, including
retaliation against men who have taken leave under the Family and Medical Leave Act
to care for their newborn children or other family members).
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